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Proximate Cause and Civil RICO Standing: The
Narrowly Restrictive and Mechanical Approach in
Lerner v. Fleet Bank and Baisch v. Gallina
“The most important and most constant
cause of dissatisfaction with all law at all
times is to be found in the necessarily
mechanical operation of legal rules.”
Roscoe Pound 1
.

I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of civil RICO, standing is an important and
difficult issue. The complexity of the civil provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute of the
Organized Crime Control Act makes standing particularly
problematic.2 One of the primary dilemmas of the RICO statute is
the tension resulting from the treble damages provision of §

1. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 731 (1906). Pound acknowledges the necessity of legal rules and
uniform application of the law but also the need to consider each case and allow for flexibility
depending on the case at hand. Id. at 731–32. Moreover, Pound describes the divergence
between ethics and the law, between the individual and the jurist: “The individual looks at
cases one by one and measures them by his individual sense of right and wrong. The lawyer
must look at cases in gross, and must measure them largely by an artificial standard.” Id. at
733. As this Comment will show, standing in a civil RICO context should follow a case-bycase approach and resist any mechanical exercise.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000) allows for civil actions, but in order to bring a civil RICO
claim, the plaintiff must establish that she was injured by violations of § 1962, which contains
the criminal prohibitions of the RICO provision. See id. § 1964(c). Section 1962 refers to
§ 1961, the definition section, which in turn lists a plethora of predicate acts that one must
establish in order to show the pattern of racketeering activity necessary to violate § 1962. Id. §
1962. See generally Antonella M. Madonia, Comment, Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp.: Standing to Sue Under Section 1964(c) of RICO for the Securities Fraud
Plaintiff, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 923 (1993) (discussing the standing requirements and their
complexities under civil RICO); Virginia G. Maurer, Holmes v. SIPC: A New Direction for
RICO Standing?, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (1992) (same); Eric W. McNeil, Comment,
Civil RICO Standing: Direct/Indirect Distinction Should Not Be Taken Sitting Down, 64 TUL.
L. REV. 1239 (1990) (same); Daniel Joseph Shapiro, Note, Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corporation: Proximate Cause Dims the Bright-Lines of RICO Standing, 53 LA. L.
REV. 1911 (1993) (same).
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1964(c).3 While many litigants have a large incentive to transform
their fraud cases, for example, into RICO suits in order to obtain
treble damages, courts are tempted to limit the availability of the
federal court system for just such attempts.4 In light of this friction,
courts have long employed standing as a powerful tool to rid
themselves of civil RICO cases.5 At the same time, federal circuit
courts have either created standing rules that have been overturned
as needlessly restrictive6 or have yet to set down a standard that is
consistent and uniform with other circuits or the broad purposes of
the RICO statute.7 Circuit courts, however, are not left afloat on
troubled waters without any guiding light to bring them safely
ashore.8 Even though courts have applied various standards in
judging civil RICO standing, the Supreme Court set forth an
appropriate three-factor approach to decide proximate cause, and
therefore standing, under civil RICO.

3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
4. See Michael Goldsmith & Evan S. Tilton, Proximate Cause in Civil Racketeering
Cases: The Misplaced Role of Victim Reliance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 98–99 (2002)
(noting the “broader judicial assault on civil RICO”); Albert A. Citro, III, Note, After Sedima:
The Lower Courts ’ Use of Proximate Cause as a Limitation on Civil RICO, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L.
607, 610 & nn.14–15, 616 (1991); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
485–86 (1985) (noting the “variety of approaches taken by the lower courts” as a reaction to
the “proliferation of civil RICO litigation,” specifically the implementation of two novel
standing requirements for plaintiffs).
5. Maurer, supra note 2, at 74 & n.12 (discussing the attempts by courts to restrict the
availability of civil RICO, especially by the use of standing rules). The Supreme Court rejected
the vast majority of these standing rules. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479 (rejecting the
argument that a plaintiff must allege that the defendant be convicted of a predicate act or a
RICO violation and also rejecting “racketeering injury” as a necessary component of standing);
H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232 (1989) (rejecting a restrictive
notion of “pattern” under the civil RICO statute).
6. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479; H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 232.
7. An example of the inconsistency is the current division among circuit courts in
developing the proper proximate cause standard for standing under civil RICO. Compare, e.g.,
Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir.
2003) (requiring some amount of reliance in which fraud is part of the predicate acts of
RICO), with Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 850–51 (6th Cir. 2003) (employing
common-law principles for proximate cause), and Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
228 F.3d 429, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (using a three-factor test to determine standing under
proximate cause).
8. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“The absence of precise definitions,
however . . . hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the law of standing.”).
.
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Historically, although the Supreme Court has struck down
several lower court attempts at fashioning standing requirements,9
the Court, in the eyes of many other courts, has less successfully
provided any concrete guidelines for standing under civil RICO.10 In
1992, the Supreme Court faced a case that gave ample opportunity
to delineate some of the details of civil RICO standing in Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp.11 The Court, however, read a
proximate cause element into the civil RICO statute and decided the
case on proximate cause grounds without addressing the exact
standing question presented.12 This decision has led the vast majority
of courts to adopt proximate cause as the primary tool for judging
standing under civil RICO.13 Although the Court discussed
proximate cause at length in the Holmes decision, lower courts have
found no general standard explicated by the Court14 and have
subsequently employed a variety of proximate cause tests to
determine civil RICO standing.15 Courts have principally derived
9. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493, 495 (rejecting the argument that a plaintiff must
allege that the defendant be convicted of the predicate acts and also rejecting “racketeering
injury” as a necessary component of standing); H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 232 (rejecting a
restrictive notion of “pattern” under the civil RICO statute).
10. Civil RICO standing, then, may be considered by some as very much in line with
the Court’s overall standing jurisprudence: “incoherent,” “permeated with sophistry,” and “a
word game.” William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
11. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
12. Id. at 265–69.
13. See Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v.
Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2002); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec.
Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2001); Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641,
654–55 (11th Cir. 2001); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443 (3d
Cir. 2000).
14. See Madonia, supra note 2, at 960. The idea that there was no general standard set
forth by the Court arises from the fact that circuit courts have developed a variety of different
standards for proximate cause under RICO. See, e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485–86 (noting the
“variety of approaches taken by the lower courts” as a reaction to the “proliferation of civil
RICO litigation”). To the contrary, however, the Supreme Court did provide a standard to
decide proximate cause standing for civil RICO. See discussion infra Part III.B.
15. See supra note 7. Compare, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours &
Co., 341 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring some amount of reliance in which fraud is
part of the predicate acts of RICO), with Perry, 324 F.3d at 845 (employing common-law
principles for proximate cause), and Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 228 F.3d at 443 (using a threefactor test to determine standing under proximate cause), and Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing a zone-of-interest test derived from Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Holmes), and Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam Inc., 79 F.3d 234, 237–
38 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), and Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61
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these tests from dicta found throughout the majority and concurring
opinions of Holmes.16 The Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes,
however, did provide a proper tripartite standard for determining
proximate cause, and therefore standing, under civil RICO.17 It set
forth three factors, none of which are rigid or per se rules, to
determine whether a plaintiff satisfies the proximate cause
requirement of civil RICO standing.18 This fluid approach allows
courts to account for the limits of standing as well as the policies and
compromises embodied in the RICO statute.
In 2003, the Second Circuit declared its standard for standing in
federal court under the civil provisions of the RICO statute in Lerner
v. Fleet Bank 19 and Baisch v. Gallina.20 In both cases, the Second
Circuit appropriately decided to rely on a proximate cause analysis as
the primary test to determine standing under civil RICO.21 The
court in each case focused on proximate cause and eliminated any
zone-of-interest analysis,22 which many courts (including the district
court in Lerner)23 have employed to decide standing under civil
RICO.24 The Second Circuit, however, required a “direct injury that
.

F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). A more detailed discussion of these tests is found in
infra Part II.E.
16. See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery, 341 F.3d 1292; Perry, 324 F.3d at 845; Newton, 207
F.3d at 447.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.B; see also Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,
269–70, 273–74 (1992).
19. 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 532 (2003).
20. 346 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2003).
21. See id. at 372–73 (“[B]ecause our RICO proximate cause analysis adequately
incorporates the zone-of-interests test’s concerns in most cases, we have never applied that test
independently from our RICO proximate cause analysis. We now clarify that it is inappropriate
to apply a zone-of-interests test independent of this circuit’s proximate cause analysis.”);
Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122 (“[T]he better approach is . . . if the standing issue may be resolved
on proximate cause grounds . . . .”).
22. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373; Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122.
23. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 146 F. Supp. 2d 224, 231–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (determining
standing based on a “‘zone-of-interest test,’” which is designed to determine whether “the
plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be benefited by the provision at issue” (citing
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 287 (Scalia, J., concurring))), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 318 F.3d 113
(2d Cir. 2003).
24. See Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000); Abrahams v.
Young & Rubicam Inc., 79 F.3d 234, 237–38 (2d Cir. 1996); Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc.
v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995); see also infra notes 166–71
and accompanying text.
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was foreseeable,”25 which it specifically defined, coupled with a
complete absence of any intervening causes to establish proximate
cause and therefore standing.26 The court’s analysis rested squarely
on a narrowly focused, mechanical test, allowing standing only to
plaintiffs that can prove strict standards of proximity. This directness
test flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s adoption of a more fluid
three-factor approach for proximate cause.
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s appropriate tripartite analysis
for standing in Holmes, which correctly addresses the concerns of
civil RICO, standing, and the tensions and balances between RICO’s
broadness and standing limitations, the Second Circuit formulated a
mechanical and categorical proximate cause test that focuses too
narrowly on directness in order to find standing under civil RICO.
Part II gives a brief overview of the Court’s standing doctrine and
the background for the Second Circuit’s decisions in Lerner and
Baisch, examining 18 U.S.C. § 1964, otherwise known as civil
RICO, and its legislative history, as well as the Court’s principal
decisions on civil RICO standing—Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.27
and Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.28—and the circuit
decisions that have followed. Part III discusses the pertinent policies
underlying the Court’s standing analysis and how the Court’s
decision in Holmes properly set forth a three-factor analysis for civil
RICO standing that addresses the concerns of standing in federal
court and the policies of RICO. Contrary to the Court’s decision in
Holmes, the Second Circuit created a narrowly focused and
mechanical test for directness in deciding proximate cause.
Ultimately, the Second Circuit sub silentio rids itself of the analysis
found in Holmes and its own decision in Commercial Cleaning

25. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373 (discussing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123). Other circuits have
similarly required a “direct injury” to satisfy proximate cause. See Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
324 F.3d 845, 848–49 (6th Cir. 2003); Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l
Ass’n, 298 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2002); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply,
Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2001). But see Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163,
1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (employing a three-part analysis based on Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp.); Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374,
381 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 439
(3d Cir. 2000) (same).
26. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373 (discussing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123).
27. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
28. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
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Services v. Colin Service Systems, Inc.29 in favor of a standard that
mechanistically and directly disrupts the policies and compromises
formulated by the Court and Congress to determine civil RICO
standing. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE BACKGROUND TO CIVIL RICO AND THE SECOND
CIRCUIT’S DOCTRINE OF STANDING
Standing is a complex issue that courts have not defined or
explicated with great clarity or consistency. The Supreme Court,
however, has provided basic premises upon which to base an analysis
of both constitutional minimum standards for standing in court and
judicially self-imposed restraints that limit a plaintiff’s access to
federal court. Specifically, standing under civil RICO has had a fairly
long and contentious history. Although written broadly to remedy a
variety of crimes,30 the statute has given rise to a plethora of
interesting and novel standing requirements.31 Part II.A explains
both the constitutional and prudential elements of the Court’s
standing doctrine. Part II.B details the statutory provisions and
history of civil RICO, demonstrating both its broad reach and its
complexity. Part II.C delineates some of the standing requirements
initially constructed by courts to inhibit civil RICO suits, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent elimination of those limits, and the
Court’s institution of general standing requirements as decided in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.32 Part II.D explains the Court’s
opinion in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,33 illustrating
the rise of the proximate cause requirement of civil RICO standing.
Part II.E reviews some of the Second Circuit’s decisions regarding

29. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 381.
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (“The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.”); see also Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 88 (noting
that the RICO provisions “sweep[] broadly”); Elizabeth Anne Fuerstman, Note, Trying
(Quasi) Criminal Cases in Civil Courts: The Need for Constitutional Safeguards in Civil RICO
Litigation, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 169, 169–70 (1991).
31. See generally Citro, supra note 4, at 613–16; Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at
98–99 (noting the “broader judicial assault on civil RICO”); Fuerstman, supra note 30, at 170
(noting the “novel applications of the statute”); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485–86 (noting the
“variety of approaches taken by the lower courts” as a reaction to the “proliferation of civil
RICO litigation”).
32. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
33. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
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civil RICO standing and its proximate cause standards leading up to
Lerner v. Fleet Bank34 and Baisch v. Gallina.35 Part II.F provides the
factual background to the Second Circuit’s recent cases, which
announced the new test for proximate cause in the Second Circuit.
A. The Supreme Court’s Standing Doctrine
Unfortunately, the doctrine of standing espoused by the
Supreme Court is “not . . . defined with complete consistency.”36
Some have accused the Court’s standing analyses of being
“incoherent,”37 “‘permeated with sophistry,’”38 “‘a word game
played by secret rules,’”39 and “largely meaningless.”40 This may
explain why many courts have used standing in civil RICO cases as
an adaptable and effective tool to relieve themselves of unwanted
suits.41 Despite the apparent negativity towards this principle, the
Supreme Court has articulated certain standards and policies
necessary for standing in federal court.42
In essence, standing is “whether the litigant is entitled to have
the court decide the merits of the dispute or of [the] particular
issues.”43 In other words, standing determines whether the “plaintiff
has a right to judicial relief.” in the federal court system.44 The focus

34. 318 F.3d 113 (2003).
35. 346 F.3d 366 (2003).
36. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
37. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 221.
38. Id. (citing 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at
342 (2d ed. 1983)).
39. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
40. Id. (summarizing the Court’s doctrine as “a largely meaningless ‘litany’ recited
before ‘the Court . . . chooses up sides and decides the case’” (citing Abram Chayes, The
Supreme Court 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 22–23 (1982))).
41. Cf. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3531 (2d ed. 1987) (“[S]tanding doctrine is no more than a convenient tool to
avoid uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the merits.” (citing Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
42. A complete explication of the Court’s standing doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Comment and therefore this discussion will necessarily exclude certain nuances of the Court’s
doctrine.
43. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
44. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 229.
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of standing is centered on the plaintiff.45—whether the particular
litigant is “properly situated to be entitled to . . . judicial
determination.”46 Thus, although a claim may have merit, the
claimant may be denied access to the courts because he or she is not
the proper party to bring such a suit.47 Although judges and scholars
seem to suggest that the merits of a case are considered to some
extent in determining standing,48 because the focus supposedly falls
squarely on the plaintiff, the exact nature of the determination of the
merits of the case in deciding standing is somewhat vague.49 The
“standing question” is thus a mixed bag of jurisdictional and meritbased considerations and boils down to “whether the constitutional
or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to
judicial relief.”50 Part of this imprecision or vagueness surrounding

45. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484 (“The requirement of standing ‘focuses on the party
seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated.’” (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968))).
46. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at § 3531 (“The focus is on the party, not the
claim itself. The party focused upon, moreover, is invariably the plaintiff.”); see also Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he standing inquiry requires careful judicial
examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled
to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.”) (emphasis added). Wright and Miller also
note, however, that there are rare occasions in which a court’s focus turns to the defendant
rather than the plaintiff. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at § 3531.
47. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 41, at § 3531; see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 500
(“[S]tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular
conduct is illegal . . . .”).
48. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (“[T]he standing inquiry requires careful judicial
examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled
to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (explaining that
standing “often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted”); Fletcher, supra note
10, at 234 (discussing the standing question as a look to the merits but only “a sort of nibble
at the apple before plaintiff takes a real bite”).
49. See generally Fletcher, supra note 10, at 221. Fletcher argues that instead of treating
standing as a preliminary jurisdictional issue and as something somewhat divorced from the
merits of the case, as the Supreme Court has done, the proper analysis for standing is
“simply . . . a question on the merits of plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 223; see also Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV.
163 (1992). Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)
(discussing standing as a threshold matter before even reaching the merits of the case), with
Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (discussing standing as “in no way depend[ing] on the merits” but
nevertheless being connected to the “source of the claim asserted”). Fletcher argues that his
admonition to view standing as a merit-based consideration is simply the recognitions of an
emerging trend in scholarly and judicial discussions. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 223 n.18.
50. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
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standing rests on the fact that standing “incorporates concepts
concededly not susceptible of precise definition.”51
The Court’s standing analysis is essentially composed of
constitutional and prudential limits to a litigant’s access to federal
court.52 “Constitutional standing” arises from the “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III of the Constitution.53 The
requirement of justiciability—“a case or controversy”—is the
“threshold question in every federal case.”54 The need for a case or
controversy forms the very basis of standing, and neither the Court
nor Congress can expand or tighten the restrictions of constitutional
standing.55 Constitutional standing is a baseline below which neither
the Court nor Congress can go. In determining constitutional
standing, courts look to three components: (1) the plaintiff must
have an “injury in fact,” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the
defendant’s actions, and (3) “the injury will likely be redressed by a
favorable decision” of the court.56
None of these requirements of constitutional standing is
intended to place insurmountable obstacles in the way of the
claimant. Rather, the requirements ensure that there is a proper case
before the court. The “injury in fact” component simply requires
51. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
52. See, e.g., id. at 750–51; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Warth,
422 U.S. at 498).
53. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162; Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
Article III provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies
between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
54. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
55. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (noting that “the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” are these constitutional limits); Bennett, 520
U.S. at 162 (“[U]nlike their constitutional counterparts, [prudential limits] can be modified or
abrogated by Congress.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (noting that even if Congress changes
prudential requirements, constitutional requirements remain).
56. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Valley Forge, 454 U.S.
at 471–72 (1982) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976))).
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that the plaintiff have “an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual and
imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”57 Likewise, the
second prong, requiring that the injury be fairly traceable, asks
whether there is a “causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of” and not merely a complaint resulting from
“the independent action of some third party not before the court.”58
Lastly, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that
the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”59 Ultimately,
constitutional standing creates the minimum standard for a case
(and, more to the point, a plaintiff) to enter into federal court.
Unlike constitutionally imposed minimum requirements,
prudential limitations rest upon “the proper—and properly limited—
role of the courts in a democratic society.”60 The prudential limits of
standing are “judicially self-imposed,”61 although the policies and
concerns underlying them deal essentially with the separation of
powers between an “anti-majoritarian federal judiciary” and a
properly elected legislative body.62 Through a variety of prudential
standing limits, courts eliminate or restrict various potential
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may be denied access to federal court if they
simply base their claim on “raising another person’s legal rights.”63
Thus, plaintiffs are required to “assert [their] own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest [their] claims” on injuries to another.64

57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 560–61.
59. Id. at 561.
60. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 498); see also infra notes 208–
13 and accompanying text.
61. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining that “some . . . elements [of standing] express
merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government”); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
62. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222. One of the central concerns governing standing is
that an unelected judiciary may begin to assume the role of a superlegislature, creating laws
and imposing its will in a domain more properly delegated to the legislature. Id. (citing A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
(1962)); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). If courts began to hear cases
without regard to the propriety of the case, then the courts may become a superlawmaking
body and, more importantly, one without the normal democratic check.
63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)).
64. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
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This requirement, in some ways, echoes the minimum requirements
of constitutional standing.65 Also, courts generally exclude plaintiffs
who attempt to adjudicate “generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed [by] representative branches.”66 For
example, harms or injuries that are “shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens . . . do[] not warrant
exercise of jurisdiction.”67 Courts have additionally required, in some
contexts, “that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked” in order to satisfy prudential
standing.68 This generally means that in order to have standing, the
plaintiff, or the harm suffered by the plaintiff, must come within the
class of persons or injuries Congress meant to protect.69 This latter
standing limitation typically arises in interpreting the standing criteria
of statutes.70
Unlike constitutional limits, however, these prudential concerns
may “be modified or abrogated by Congress.”71 By statute, Congress
may grant standing to a much wider class of litigants than would
have standing based on court-imposed prudential limits alone. Of
course, Congress cannot circumvent constitutional standing, which is
always a baseline minimum for all cases.72 But a statute may
effectively eliminate the prudential limits traditionally imposed by
courts.73 The shift from considerations of the court to issues of

65. Id. at 498–99 (“[T]he [constitutional] standing question is whether the plaintiff has
‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation
of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his
behalf.” (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
66. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474–75).
67. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
68. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474–75).
69. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 161–65 (1997).
70. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97 (noting that the zone-of-interest test “is an issue of
statutory standing”); see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (suggesting that the zone-of-interest test
applies to interests “protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional
guarantee invoked in the suit” (emphasis added)); Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222–23; Craig
R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and
Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (1994).
71. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).
72. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that
constitutional standing is “the irreducible constitutional minimum”).
73. See infra Part III.A.
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congressional enactment is sometimes called “statutory standing.”74
Once Congress has enacted a statute, the focus of a court’s standing
determination turns to considerations of which persons or interests
the statute protects,75 or how the statutory enactment has modified
or abrogated traditional prudential concerns.76 Ultimately, provided
a litigant still satisfies the Article III limits placed on the judiciary, he
or she may have standing through a congressionally granted right of
action, even though such a litigant would have been barred by
normal considerations, such as the bar against asserting the rights of
others.77
B. Section 1964 and Its History
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute was
enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.78
In addition to the criminal prohibitions of the RICO statute,79
Congress also provided for civil remedies,80 specifically for treble

74. See, e.g., Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 286–87 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the focus on whether the plaintiff falls within the class that
the statutory provision was intended to benefit). The problem with “statutory standing” is that
it has not been defined consistently, if at all, by courts.
75. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97; Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
76. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164 (examining whether the statutory provision at hand
had modified or even eliminated the normal standard for determining standing).
77. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (“Congress may grant an express right
of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that constitutional standing
is an “irreducible . . . minimum”); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539,
560 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Although Congress cannot change constitutional standing
requirements, it ‘can modify or even abrogate prudential standing requirements, thus
extending standing to the full extent permitted by Article III.’” (citation omitted)).
78. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922,
942 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)).
79. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–1963.
80. Id. § 1964. Section 1964 contains four provisions: subsection (a) authorizes the
courts to employ a variety of civil remedies to effectuate the purpose or goal of the statute;
subsection (b) authorizes the Attorney General to institute proceedings under § 1964;
subsection (c) allows for any person to bring suit for treble damages; and subsection (d)
delineates some of the effects of the civil remedies. “Civil RICO,” as it is typically referred to,
is located in § 1964(c) and reads:
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
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damage awards in civil suits.81 Civil RICO is both complex and
expansive.82 Although the statute is riddled with cross references and
complexities, the general language of civil RICO broadly provides
standing to “any person.”83 Specifically, § 1964(c) of the RICO
statute provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person injured in his
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including any reasonable
attorney’s fee.”84
Although facially broad, civil RICO standing rests on proving
that the defendant violated the criminal RICO provisions, an
understanding of which requires examining a complex maze of cross
references. Section 1962 enumerates four possible RICO violations:
first, subsection (a) prohibits any person from investing any income
derived from a “pattern of racketeering activity” in any enterprise
that affects interstate commerce;85 second, subsection (b) prohibits
any person from acquiring or maintaining any interest in, or control
of, any enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of

securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the
preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally
convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall
start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
Id. § 1964(c).
81. Id.
82. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009,
1011–12, 1014, 1031 (1980) (noting the broadness of the RICO statute as it is meant to
reach a variety of new and illusive crimes, while also acknowledging RICO as “one of the most
sophisticated statutes ever enacted by Congress”).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). The
Court in Turkette held that “the courts are without authority to restrict the application of the
[RICO] statute” beyond its statutory language. Id. at 587. Essentially, this means that courts
are to read the term “person,” as with all definitions within the statute, as broad as the statute
intends without restriction. See, e.g., Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983)
(finding that there is no serious argument that the term “person” be restricted in any sense,
including “requiring that the [term] ‘person’ be affiliated with ‘organized crime’”).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). The subsection states:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1021.
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racketeering activity;86 third, subsection (c) prohibits any person who
is employed or associated with an enterprise affecting interstate
commerce to conduct or participate in the enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity;87 and fourth, subsection
(d) prohibits any person from conspiring to violate any of the other
three criminal provisions.88
The general terminology and prerequisites to a civil RICO suit
are set forth in § 1961. A “pattern of racketeering activity” is defined
as “at least two acts of racketeering activity,” one act occurring after
the enactment of the statute and the last act occurring no later than
ten years after the first violation.89 “Racketeering activity” in turn is
composed of any one of numerous, far-reaching acts defined under
the statute, taken from the common law, or found under federal and
state statutes.90 These “predicate acts” range from murder,
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). The subsection reads, “It shall be unlawful for any person
through a pattern of racketeering activity [or through collection of an unlawful debt] to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” Id.; see also
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1022.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The subsection states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id.; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1022.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”); see also Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 82, at 1022.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
90. See id. § 1961(1). Subsection 1 defines “racketeering activity” as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or
listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which
is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659
(relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is
felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds),
sections 891–894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1028
(relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents),
section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access
devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the
procurement of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to
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kidnapping, gambling, arson, and robbery to federal statutory
prohibitions, such as passport or securities fraud.91 This list of

the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 (relating to
the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461–1465 (relating to
obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510
(relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering
with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against
a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in
application and use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of
passport), section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to
fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581–1591
(relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons), section 1951 (relating to
interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section
1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956
(relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to
engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the
commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to
sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to
interstate transportation of stolen property), section 2318 (relating to trafficking in
counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer program
documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual
works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), section
2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and
music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in
goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in
certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341–2346 (relating to
trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421–24 (relating to white slave
traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section
186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense
involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (except a case under section
157 of this title), fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a
controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United States, (E) any act which is
indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, (F) any act
which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating
to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or
assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to
importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such section of
such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain, or (G) any act that is
indictable under any provision listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B).
Id.
91. See id.
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predicate crimes is sizeable and covers a wide variety of acts and farreaching offenses, such as mail or wire fraud, which are even more
expansive than traditional concepts of fraud and are designed as
catchall offenses to ensnare newly imagined forms of deception.92
Mail fraud is generally considered “the most inclusive of the federal
statutes, since it covers a broad range of criminal activity rooted in
fraud.”93 Thus, although complex, civil RICO is written broadly—
liability results from any injury to business or property inflicted
through a pattern of racketeering activity (satisfied by a wide variety
of far-reaching acts) affecting an enterprise (which is also defined
broadly.)94
The RICO statute, including its civil provisions, was designed as
an expansive and sweeping tool to defeat organized crime’s
infiltration and exploitation of American economic systems.95 The
criminal and civil penalties were designed to deliver the “mortal blow
against the property interests of organized crime.”96 The treble
damages provision of civil RICO was based on similar, but not
identical, antitrust laws, which had been successful in helping to
deter and curb economic crimes.97 Except for slight changes, the
broad language used in antitrust statutes and civil RICO laws is
substantially the same, although the policies behind each and their
intended applications differ.98 Not only are the provisions of the

92. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 86 (describing mail and wire fraud as “a
‘stop-gap’ device which permits the prosecution of newly-conceived fraud until such time that
Congress enact[s] particularized legislation to cope with the new frauds” (quoting United
States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1248 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976))).
93. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1031 (citing 1 CORNELL INST. ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON RICO 120–53 (1980–1981)).
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any other union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”).
95. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 901, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)); see also Fuerstman,
supra note 30, at 169 & n.2. See generally Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1010–21.
96. 116 CONG. REC. 602 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970) (statement by Sen. Hruska).
97. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486–88 (1985) (recounting the
legislative history and explicit adoption of antitrust-like treble damage provisions in civil
RICO); see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1040 (explaining that civil RICO “is
modeled after, but is not identical to, section 4 of the Clayton Act”).
98. See also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1040–43 (explaining that although the
language is borrowed and is very similar to antitrust statutes, the policies behind each counsel
against applying the same stringent standards under antitrust standing to RICO standing).
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (“Any person injured in his business or property by
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RICO statute written broadly, but Congress also explicitly mandated
that the statute be read generously: “[t]he provisions of this title
shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”99
Some members of Congress viewed the liberal mandate, and the civil
RICO provisions in particular, as troublesomely expansive.100 They
understood the proposed civil RICO sections to reach far and wide,
affecting legitimate businesses in no way associated or touched by
organized crime.101 Despite those reservations concerning the scope
and reach of the statute, in the end, Congress enacted a wideranging law nonetheless.102
C. Early Attempts at Standing Restrictions and Sedima’s Broad
Concept of Civil RICO Standing
Because the plain language of § 1964 appears on its face to
generally grant standing with little restriction—“any person injured
in business or property”—and because civil RICO created a powerful
temptation to transform most economically based fraud claims into
RICO suits, courts fashioned a variety of standing requirements for

reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages . . . .”), with 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (“[A]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained . . . .”).
99. § 904, 84 Stat. at 947; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1032–33
(“[The] construction of RICO is one of a generous, rather than a parsimonious reading of its
promise of new criminal and civil remedies. The statute was drafted from the perspective of the
victim, not the perpetrator.”).
100. For the dissenting views of Representative John Conyers, Jr., Representative Abner
Mikva, and Representative William F. Ryan, on the Organized Crime Control Act, see H.R.
REP. NO. 91-1549, at 58 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4076. These
“dissenters” specifically felt that § 1964(c) posed great problems for legitimate businesses and
businesspeople, as it
provides invitation for disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass innocent
businessmen engaged in interstate commerce by authorizing private damage suits. A
competitor need only raise the claim that his rival has derived gains from two games
of poker, and, because this title prohibits even the “indirect use” of such gains—a
provision with tremendous outreach—litigation has begun.
Id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4083.
101. See id., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4076.
102. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 58 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,
4034 (“civil remedies . . . contain[] broad provisions”). See generally Blakey & Gettings, supra
note 82, at 1014–21 (describing the legislative process of the RICO statute, including the
detractors and the enactment of a far-reaching law despite those detractors).
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civil RICO cases, intending to limit access to federal courts.103 Only
apparently exacerbating the problem, the Supreme Court expanded
civil RICO’s reach as far as its language would allow. In United
States v. Turkette,104 the Court declared that courts “are without
authority to restrict the application of the [civil RICO] statute”
beyond its statutory language.105 Thus, even though enacted
primarily to combat organized crime,106 RICO was not restricted to
such purposes, but reached legitimate businesses and businesspeople
as well as mobsters and organized criminal groups.107 Without the
ability to restrict civil RICO claims to cases involving organized
crime, courts began, intentionally or not, to create alternative
standing requirements, many of which were based on analogous
antitrust standing criteria,108 to limit the RICO cases on their
dockets.109 Two of these standing requirements, created by the
Second Circuit, included only allowing private RICO claims against
(1) “defendants who had been convicted of criminal charges, and
[(2)] only where there had occurred a ‘racketeering injury,’”110
103. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1985) (noting the
“recent proliferation of civil RICO litigation within” the circuits and “variety of approaches
taken by the lower courts”); see also Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 93–99; Maurer,
supra note 2, at 79–81; McNeil, supra note 2, at 1242–55.
104. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
105. Id. at 587.
106. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat.
922, 923 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)). Congress’s declared purpose was “to
seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.” Id.; see Fuerstman, supra note 30, at 169–70 (“[T]here has been a recent
explosion of civil RICO litigation, and courts have become more receptive to novel
applications of the statute. . . . This current use of civil RICO was never anticipated by
Congress, which crafted the statute as a means of combating criminal enterprises involved in
murder, extortion and drug-smuggling.”); cf. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1013 &
n.15 (acknowledging that RICO targets organized crime specifically but also pointing out that
“‘[o]rganized crime’ is a phrase with many meanings,” which do not necessarily mean only
Mafia-type organizations but may broadly encompass a variety other types of criminal
behavior).
107. See Fuerstman, supra note 30, at 169–70; Madonia, supra note 2, at 926–27.
108. Maurer, supra note 2, at 79–86.
109. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 486–88 (1985); Goldsmith &
Tilton, supra note 4, at 97–98 (noting the “artificial” restrictions imposed by the courts, such
as “jurisdictional limitations, onerous pleading requirements, and other obstacles designed to
curtail civil RICO litigation”).
110. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481 (summarizing the Second Circuit’s formulation of standing
standards).
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which was “an injury ‘different in kind from that occurring as a result
of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the
predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was
designed to deter.’”111
In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.,112 the Supreme Court
eliminated these novel standing requirements created by the circuit
courts and expressed the general requirement that civil RICO
standing be read broadly. Sedima involved a Belgian company that
entered a joint venture with another corporation, Imrex.113 Imrex
contracted to furnish electronic components to Sedima.114 The
agreement provided that buyers would place their orders through
Sedima, and Imrex would then “obtain the necessary parts in [the
United States] and ship them to Europe”; the two companies would
split any proceeds.115 Sedima, however, alleged “that Imrex was
presenting inflated bills, cheating [it] out of a portion of its proceeds
by collecting for nonexistent expenses.”116 Among other things,
Sedima filed civil RICO claims against Imrex, contending that Imrex
violated § 1964 through the predicate acts of wire and mail fraud.117
The district and appellate courts both found that RICO required a
“racketeering injury.”118 Additionally, the court of appeals mandated
that the defendant in a civil RICO action must also have been
“criminally convicted of the predicate acts . . . or of a RICO
violation.”119
After reviewing the broad language and legislative history of the
private remedy provisions of RICO,120 the Court concluded that
these two standing requirements were inconsistent with the broad
purposes of RICO and, therefore, untenable.121 Although the Court
recognized the “proliferation of civil RICO litigation within the
111. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 479.
113. Id. at 483.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 483–84.
116. Id. at 484.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 484–85. The “racketeering injury” was an analogy to antitrust law that
required an “antitrust injury.” See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269
n.15 (1992).
119. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485.
120. Id. at 486–88.
121. Id. at 493, 495.
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Second Circuit and in other Courts of Appeals,”122 it also
acknowledged the fact that § 1964 was designed as a “[p]rivate
attorney general provision[]”—“to fill [in] prosecutorial gaps.”123
Consistent with the statute’s purpose, its language, and its enactors’
intent, courts are to read civil RICO standing broadly.124
Accordingly, as the Court instructed, “if Congress’ liberalconstruction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964,
where RICO’s remedial purposes are most evident.”125
After determining the broad nature of civil RICO, the Court
then provided the standard for private RICO standing by turning to
the expansive language of the statute: a “plaintiff only has standing
if . . . he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct
constituting the violation.”126 The Court also noted a potential
limitation, however, in that “the compensable injury necessarily is
the harm caused by predicate acts, sufficiently related to constitute a
pattern.”127 Keeping with the broad reach of RICO, the Supreme
Court additionally found significant the fact that an attempt was
made to add “RICO-like provisions to the Sherman Act.”128
Congress abandoned this attempt, however, because antitrust-type
laws, if adopted completely in a RICO context, “could create
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of . . . a private
litigant [who] would have to contend with a body of precedent—
appropriate in a purely antitrust context—setting strict requirements
on questions such as ‘standing to sue’ and ‘proximate cause.’”129
Such problems are precisely “the problems Congress sought to
avoid.”130 According to the Court, therefore, strict requirements on
standing and proximate cause are inappropriate under civil RICO.

122. Id. at 485–86.
123. Id. at 493.
124. Id. at 491 n.10, 493, 496–97; see also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922, 947 (“The provisions of this title shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”).
125. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496; see supra note 97 and accompanying text for Congress’s
liberal mandate.
126. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496.
127. Id. at 497; see Maurer, supra note 2, at 82–83 (noting the “potential narrowing of
private RICO” arising from this statement).
128. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969) (ABA comments on
S. 2048)).
129. Id. (quoting 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969)).
130. Id. at 499.
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Although Sedima provided an expansive standing analysis, the
precise standing requirements for civil RICO suits remained a
contentious battlefield of warring constraints. Among the issues
raised or lingering in the wake of Sedima were whether the
proximate cause standard under civil RICO standing required direct
or only indirect injury,131 and whether a plaintiff must meet the
conditions for standing under the predicate acts as well as RICO,
especially in securities fraud actions.132 After Sedima, courts split over
whether standing for a civil RICO action required a direct injury or
allowed a more pervasive, indirect injury.133 Many courts chose to
limit standing for private RICO actions by employing a direct
proximate cause standard that required the plaintiff to have sustained
“a direct, personal injury.”134 In other decisions, the question arose
as to whether a plaintiff must not only satisfy the civil RICO
standing requirements, but also the standing components of the
predicate acts.135 This latter question principally arose in the context
of securities fraud litigation,136 in which, under Rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to gain standing to
sue.137
131. See Maurer, supra note 2, at 83–86; McNeil, supra note 2, at 1245–46.
132. See Madonia, supra note 2, at 932–33.
133. See Citro, supra note 4, at 623; Maurer, supra note 2, at 82–83 (noting that the
Court’s holding in Sedima concerning “the proximate cause test arguably could result in
recovery for both direct and indirect consequences of the defendant’s actions, particularly
those injures that flowed from competitive losses”); McNeil, supra note 2, at 1245. Compare
Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1987), and Rand v. AnacondaEricsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 579 (1986), and
Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[A]n indirectly injured party should
look to the recovery of the directly injured party, not to the wrongdoer, for relief.”), and
Warren v. Mfrs. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 759 F.2d 542, 544–46 (6th Cir. 1985), and Levey v.
E. Stewart Mitchell, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1030, 1034–35 (D. Md. 1984), aff’d, 762 F.2d 998
(4th Cir. 1985), with Terre du Lac Ass’n. v. Terre du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 472–73 (8th
Cir. 1985).
134. Crocker v. FDIC., 826 F.2d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 1987); McNeil, supra note 2, at
1248 (noting the development of direct proximate cause and its roots in the common law; also
commenting on the improper nature of common law proximate cause analysis under civil
RICO: “the direct injury requirement is a rule of common-law standing and not of RICO
standing, and its use thus should be limited strictly to those cases that justify the rule”); see also
Rand, 794 F.2d at 849; Warren, 759 F.2d at 544–46; Carter, 777 F.2d at 1176; Levey, 585
F. Supp. at 1034–35; Roeder, 814 F.2d at 29; Terre du Lac, 772 F.2d at 472–73.
135. See Madonia, supra note 2, at 932–33.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975)
(adding a purchaser-seller requirement for a 10b-5 violation). Rule 10b-5 provides:
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D. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.138
and Civil RICO Proximate Cause Standing
Although it granted certiorari to resolve the split concerning the
necessity of securities fraud predicate act standing as opposed to only
RICO standing,139 the Supreme Court decided Holmes v. Securities
Investor Protection Corp. on proximate cause grounds and established
proximate cause as the essential standing question for civil RICO.
Holmes arose from a suit initiated by the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (SIPC), alleging a fraudulent conspiracy on
the part of seventy-five defendants that led to the ruin of a
corporation and a broker-dealer.140 Authorized by Congress,141
SIPC, a private nonprofit corporation, was designed to aid failing
broker-dealers in liquidating their businesses when they failed to
meet their obligations.142 When a broker-dealer failed to satisfy her
obligations, SIPC could obtain a decree by which it would appoint a
trustee to liquidate a member’s business, return registered securities,
pool remaining unregistered securities with cash, and distribute the
pool of assets to satisfy customer claims.143 If the pool was

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). Blue Chip Stamps affirmed the requirement that to have
standing in a 10b-5 action the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities. 421 U.S. at
749 (upholding the rule in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)).
138. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
139. Id. at 264–65. The Court in Holmes was asked to resolve the circuit split concerning
whether standing under civil RICO required the plaintiff to satisfy the standing requirements
of the underlying 10b-5 Rule, which required that the plaintiff be either a purchaser or seller of
securities per Blue Chip Stamps.
140. Id. at 262.
141. See The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84
Stat. 1636 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78lll); see also Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261.
142. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 261.
143. Id.
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inadequate, SIPC was required to “advance up to $500,000 per
customer.”144
SIPC’s suit rested on a rather complex series of events. The basis
for SIPC’s RICO claim alleged that
the defendants manipulated stock of six companies by making
unduly optimistic statements about their prospects and by
continually selling small numbers of shares to create the appearance
of a liquid market; that the broker-dealers bought substantial
amounts of the stock with their own funds; that the market’s
perception of the fraud in July 1981 sent the stock plummeting;
and that this decline caused the broker-dealers’ financial difficulties
resulting in their eventual liquidation and SIPC’s advance of nearly
$13 million to cover their customers’ claims.145

The district court ruled that SIPC did not meet the purchaser-seller
standing requirements of the predicate 10b-5 acts, lacked proximate
cause, and therefore did not have standing to sue.146 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, stating that there was no such limit on civil RICO
standing and that the district court was incorrect in its proximate
cause analysis.147 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
the sole issue of standing.148
The majority opinion in Holmes authoritatively determined that
civil RICO’s “by reason of” language “carries a proximate-cause
requirement within it.”149 In announcing this necessary element of a
civil RICO action, the Court turned to the legislative history of
RICO and specifically noted that RICO’s private remedies provisions
were modeled on similar antitrust laws.150 In discussing the idea of
directness in proximate cause standards under the Clayton Act,
which the Court found applicable to the civil RICO statute, the
Court isolated three factors: (1) the difficulty of “ascertain[ing] the
144. Id. at 261–62.
145. Id. at 262–63.
146. Id. at 263–64.
147. Id. at 264.
148. Id. at 264–65. The Court in Holmes was presented with two issues: (1) “whether
SIPC had a right to sue under RICO and [(2)] whether Holmes could be held responsible for
the actions of his co-conspirators.” Id. The Court “granted the petition on the former issue
alone.” Id. at 265.
149. Id. at 265, 266 n.11, 268. The court noted the fact that “Courts of Appeals have
overwhelmingly held that not mere factual, but proximate, causation is required.” Id. at 266
n.11.
150. Id. at 267.
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amount of a plaintiff.’s damages attributable to the violation, as
distinct from other, independent factors”; (2) the need “to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at
different levels of injury from the violative acts”; and (3) the idea
that “directly injured victims can generally be counted on to
vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the
problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more
remotely.”151 The Court, in relying on these three policies,
acknowledged that it would be “virtually impossible” to announce “a
blackletter rule that will dictate the result in every case.”152 After
151. Id. at 269.
152. Id. at 272 n.20. In light of the Court’s standing analysis, which focuses on
eliminating any mechanical process for finding standing, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984), the Court’s inability to set forth a blackletter rule may be due to the undesirability
of doing so. See infra Part III.A (discussing the case-by-case approach of the Court in
determining standing and the associated benefits).
The two concurring opinions in Holmes have, to some extent, given rise to many of the
problems concerning the proximate cause standard employed by courts, as well as the creation
of new proximate tests. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion primarily focuses on resolving
the conflicted purchaser-seller requirements of the predicate securities action. See Holmes, 503
U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e should first consider the standing question
that was decided below . . . and . . . was the only clearly articulated question on which we
granted certiorari.”). However, she also comments on the proximate cause standard, resulting
in somewhat misleading notions of the majority’s position on proximate cause.
Justice O’Connor delineates the court’s proximate cause standard as limiting “the
availability of RICO’s civil remedies to those who have suffered injury in fact.” Id. at 279
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Later, she also states the standard as limiting
standing to one who is “injured in some meaningful sense.” Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Although these summations accurately describe standing or proximate cause standards, they
are not necessarily the same as those espoused by the majority opinion in Holmes. First, “injury
in fact,” although related to standing, is one of the essential requirements necessary for
constitutional standing—the bare minimum that one must plead in order to gain access to suit
in federal court. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. If the test for civil RICO standing
boils down to constitutional limits, then the causation requirement must only satisfy the fairly
broad test of “fairly traceable.” See id. But Justice O’Connor also speaks of “meaningful
injury,” i.e., a direct injury. Justice O’Connor seems to implicate notions of direct proximate
cause without even addressing the policy factors discussed by the majority. This, however,
deviates from the majority’s admonition to look to the three factors to establish proximate
cause. See infra Part III.B (discussing the proper Holmes tripartite approach).
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, which some try to fuse with the majority opinion, see
Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000); Isr. Travel Advisory Serv.,
Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995) (looking to Holmes and
causation but talking of zone-of-interest); see also Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir.
2003) (looking at Israel Travel and Newton as a hybrid of the proximate cause of Holmes and
zone-of-interest), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 532 (2003), provides, however, a completely distinct
formulation of standing and proximate cause for civil RICO. Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion, contrary to the majority’s, focuses on traditional notions of “statutory standing”—
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determining the appropriately balanced proximate causation
requirement under civil RICO standing, the Supreme Court then
declined to address whether a plaintiff must be a purchaser-seller of
the predicate securities act to have standing.153 Proximate cause
resolved the case, according to the Court, and would have solved the
previous cases that gave rise to the circuit split.154
The Holmes decision, therefore, provides the essential
requirement of proximate cause in civil RICO standing. The
Supreme Court’s pronouncement of proximate cause in determining

that is, “whether the . . . nexus . . . between the harm of which [the] plaintiff complains and
the defendant’s . . . predicate acts is of the sort that will support an action under civil RICO.”
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 286–87 (Scalia, J., concurring). Like the other two opinions, Justice
Scalia’s discussion includes a proximate cause element for standing in federal court. See id. at
287 (Scalia, J., concurring). Proximate cause, however, according to Justice Scalia, arises from
traditional requirements of standing and not necessarily because RICO has language similar to
the Clayton Act, which had been read to include proximate cause by the time RICO was
enacted. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Therefore, the causality component for civil RICO
standing is the common-law standard found in most other standing analyses. Id. at 287–88
(Scalia, J., concurring).
However, in addition to the proximate cause analysis, statutory standing has the added
requirement that the plaintiff fall within the “zone-of-interest” that the statute was designed to
protect or benefit, a test which varies according to the underlying law. Id. at 287 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The “zone-of-interest” requirement was set down in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (noting that the
“‘legal interest’ test . . . concerns . . . the question whether the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”). This zone-of-interest test is a traditional
requirement of prudential limitation. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Like proximate
cause, zone-of-interest is a “background practice against which Congress legislates.” Holmes,
503 U.S. at 287. The idea that Congress legislates against this background was reaffirmed in
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (“Congress legislates against the background of
our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.”). Both the
zone-of-interest and proximate cause tests, according to Justice Scalia, “vary according to the
nature of the criminal offenses upon which those causes of action are based.” Holmes, 503 U.S.
at 288 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, the degree of each differs according to the predicate acts,
id. (Scalia, J., concurring), and therefore on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s
zone-of-interest analysis is probably the best analysis for civil RICO standing, in addition to
various other standing contexts. For many of the reasons discussed infra Part III.A–B, the
zone-of-interest test most correctly considers the policies and compromises associated with civil
RICO standing. In the end, however, the Holmes decision has created a set of factors for
determining proximate cause in civil RICO standing. Unfortunately, after Holmes, the standing
analysis for RICO has been ripped from the Court’s generally accepted approach (i.e., zone-ofinterest) and replaced by a similar approach, but one in which courts are confused and have felt
somewhat free to fashion new and various “tests” while still claiming fidelity to Holmes.
153. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 275–76.
154. Id. at 276 (noting that “all could have been resolved on proximate-causation
grounds”).
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standing seems clear. Although, ultimately, the three policy
considerations discussed in Holmes provide for the best proximate
cause analysis in deciding civil RICO standing,155 that principle has
been only partially apparent to lower courts.
E. Subsequent Decisions Following Holmes
After the Holmes decision, numerous standards for proximate
cause under RICO’s civil remedies standing requirements arose in
several federal courts, an occurrence that has not necessarily been
remedied by subsequent Court precedent for standing.156 Various
criteria cropped up in circuit court decisions, requiring reliance,
direct injury, zone-of-interest, and, occasionally, the three-factor
approach of Holmes. After Holmes, and specifically in fraud cases,
some courts began to impose various standards of proximate cause in
civil RICO cases that specifically required a showing of reliance.157 In
these cases, courts required plaintiffs to “demonstrate that the
defendant’s misrepresentations were relied on.”158 This requirement
not only bypasses the “tripartite analysis” of Holmes, but also
eliminates a “century of mail fraud jurisprudence,” which has evolved
into a capable and powerful tool to combat new, complex forms of
fraud and schemes to defraud that in no way rest on reliance.159 Yet
courts have continued to employ this overrestrictive requirement.
Other courts mandated a strict direct injury requirement to
establish proximate cause in civil RICO cases.160 Although these
decisions have formulated a variety of ways in which to express their

155. See infra Part III.B.
156. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163 (noting that “Congress legislates against the
background of our prudential standing doctrine,” which includes zone of interest). In cases
such as Bennett, the Court has announced the standards by which standing is determined.
Unfortunately, without clear guidance on how or if civil RICO is different from those
standards, courts are left trying to reconcile various Court pronouncements.
157. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 103–08.
158. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 368 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing County of
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Green Leaf
Nursery v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003);
Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 106.
159. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 110–11.
160. Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 848–49 (6th Cir. 2003); Oki
Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 298 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2002);
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
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strict requirement,161 they all nonetheless have created a stringent
directness standard, essentially holding that only the most directly
injured plaintiffs can establish proximate cause.162 For example, in
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner,163 the Ninth Circuit found that
the directly injured party in a sham building sale was the “master
tenant” and that the sublessee, which was ultimately required to pay
a huge increase in rent, was not directly injured, even though the
“master tenant” simply passed on the increases.164
Still other courts followed Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Holmes,165 instituting a zone-of-interest analysis to determine
standing.166 Almost a combination of proximate cause and the
161. Perry, 324 F.3d at 848 (requiring a “direct injury”); Oki Semiconductor, 298 F.3d at
773 (“Some ‘direct relationship’ between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct is
necessary.”); Potomac Elec., 262 F.3d at 264 n.2 (noting that a plaintiff must demonstrate
“that damages flowed from racketeering activity itself.”); see also Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari,
7 F.3d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the requirement that “the person allegedly
deceived by the misrepresentations must be the same party who was injured by the
misrepresentations in order to allege sufficiently the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud”).
162. See, e.g., Oki Semiconductor, 298 F.3d at 771–72. In Oki, there was a conspiracy in
which bandits robbed Oki of millions in semiconductors and then laundered the proceeds of
selling those semiconductors through Tran, an employee of Wells Fargo. Id. at 771. Tran
established several accounts and moved money back and forth, finally funneling money to the
conspirators. Id. The court found Tran did not proximately cause the injury to Oki. Id. at 772.
Rather, the robbery was the direct injury. Id. at 774. Although it is hard to argue that the
result should be different in this case, it is easy to see that courts simply look for any easy first
step elimination of causation, rather than to broader notions of causality or policy
considerations, especially in light of the fact that racketeering schemes are generally more
complicated than mere robbery.
163. 31 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1994).
164. Id. at 928–29. The court found that the party that should bring suit was SRC, the
master tenant, and that if the sublessees wished to obtain any recovery from the injury they
should turn to SRC. Id. The court found that the sublessees depended on intervening parties
and therefore could not recover, even though they were the major renters in the building and
were responsible for the vast majority of the rent. Id. at 927–28. The court, in effect, created a
per se rule out of Holmes. They focused on the Holmes statement that “a plaintiff who
complain[s] of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the
defendant’s acts [is] generally said to stand at too remote a distance to recover.” Id. at 929
(alterations in original) (citing Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268
(1992)).
165. See supra note 152 (discussing the concurrences by Justices O’Connor and Scalia).
166. Newton v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2000); Isr. Travel
Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A
plaintiff claiming injury by the defendant’s violation of a statute must show not only that the
defendant violated the law but also that the plaintiff is among the persons protected by the
law.”). Although both decisions discuss zone-of-interest in analyzing standing for civil RICO,
their precise adoption of the test is less than clear. Both seem to suggest that it may be helpful
in understanding proximate cause, but whether they adopt zone-of-interest wholesale remains
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traditional zone-of-interest test, this zone-of-interest requirement
focuses on whether the plaintiff “is among the persons protected by
the law.”167 The Second Circuit actually followed this line of
reasoning in Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.168 The court
found the proper test, in statutory contexts, to be whether “the
plaintiff . . . [is] in the category the statute meant to protect, and . . .
[whether] the harm that occurred . . . [is] the ‘mischief’ the statute
sought to avoid.”169 Acknowledging the importance of “difference in
terminology,”170 the Second Circuit concluded that its formulation
of this standing test roughly equated to common-law notions of
foreseeability in proximate cause, although under a different
banner.171
Finally, some courts, including the Second Circuit,172 have
employed the tripartite policy analysis of Holmes in determining
proximate cause,173 and therefore standing, under civil RICO. These
courts have used the “directness” approach of Holmes as the
appropriate means to determine proximate cause for civil RICO,174
acknowledging the variety of standards possible under the broad
banner of proximate cause and the Court’s specific endorsement of
the three-part analysis.175 Specifically, the Second Circuit in
Commercial Cleaning Services v. Colin Service Systems, Inc. identified
the three-factor approach of Holmes as the proper standard.176 In
undetermined. See, e.g., Newton, 207 F.3d at 447 (noting the “concept of ‘zone of
interests’ . . . can be helpful in analyzing RICO standing”). But see Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d
366, 373 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that both Israel Travel and Newton employed a zone-ofinterest test independent of proximate cause).
167. Isr. Travel, 61 F.3d at 1258.
168. 79 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1996).
169. Id. at 237.
170. Id. at 237 n.3.
171. Id. The court discussed standing requirements in terms of causation, which the
court then suggested equated roughly to zone-of-interest when speaking in similar terms of
statutory standing. Id.
172. Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 381–85
(2d Cir. 2001).
173. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002); Allegheny
Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443–44 (3d Cir. 2000).
174. See, e.g., Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 381 (“We have accordingly turned to
those policy considerations explained in Holmes to guide any application of the Court’s direct
relation test.” (citing Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191
F.3d 229, 239 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999))).
175. See id.; see also Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 272 n.20.
176. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 381.
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explaining the propriety of the tripartite test, the court noted the
impossibility of formulating a blackletter rule for standing under civil
RICO.177 Additionally, the court found that proximate cause, as used
by Holmes, is a generic term to describe judicial tools and that
Holmes defined those tools.178 The court then proceeded to analyze
standing according to the three Holmes factors.179
F. The Second Circuit ’s Decisions in Lerner v. Fleet Bank
and Baisch v. Gallina
.

In 2003, the Second Circuit altered its proximate cause standing
test from the Commercial Cleaning Services and Holmes analysis to a
direct and mechanical approach. In January, the court decided
Lerner v. Fleet Bank,180 which involved the aftermath of a lawyer’s
Ponzi scheme.181 In Lerner, a lawyer, Schick, devised a scheme in
which he convinced people to invest with him based on his practice
of bidding “on distressed mortgage pools” and, upon winning the
auction, immediately reselling the pool for a quick profit.182 The
foolproof aspect of this plan arose from a ninety-day due diligence
period, in which he could rescind the purchase if he found no
seller.183 In order to carry out the scheme, however, he needed a
“deposit of substantial sums of cash as evidence of his good faith.”184
Investors deposited money in escrow accounts, apparently “covered

177. See, e.g., id. (noting that “[t]he Court stressed the difficulty of achieving precision in
fashioning a test for determining whether a plaintiff’s injury was sufficiently ‘direct’ to permit
standing under RICO. . . . It expressly warned against applying a mechanical test . . . . We have
accordingly turned to those policy considerations explained in Holmes to guide any application
of the Court’s direct relation test.”).
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., id. at 381–85 (noting in section headings the “Difficulty of Determining
Damages Attributable to the RICO Violation,” the “Difficulty of Apportioning Damages
Among Injured Parties,” and the “Ability of Other Parties to Vindicate Aims of the Statute”).
180. 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 532 (2003).
181. Id. at 117–19. This type of scheme is named after Charles Ponzi, who was convicted
for “fraudulent schemes he conducted in Boston” in the 1920s. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1180 (7th ed. 1999). This scheme typically involves “[m]oney from . . . new investors . . . used
directly to repay or pay interest to old investors, usually without any operation or revenueproducing activity other than the continual raising of new funds.” Id.
182. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 117.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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by restrictive provisions,” for which Schick would act as fiduciary.185
“Before the investors discovered his fraud, Schick had raided the
accounts repeatedly and managed to steal approximately $82
million.”186
The suit in Lerner arose when defrauded investors tried to
recover against the banks that had held the accounts. Under New
York law, banks were required to report dishonored checks to the
Lawyer’s Fund for Client Protection.187 The investors alleged that
the banks “corrupt[ed] this enterprise”—the Lawyers Fund for
Client Protection and Attorney Discipline System—by failing to
fulfill the reporting requirements.188 During the course of Schick’s
scheme, he wrote several dishonored checks from the investors’
accounts.189 The predicate acts of wire and mail fraud arose by virtue
of the banks’ mailing fraudulent statements concerning the
dishonored checks.190 The plaintiffs argued that by failing to report
the bounced and improper checks, the Attorney Discipline System
was prevented from acting against Schick, which would have led the
investors “to distrust Schick and discontinue their investments.”191
The court held that the plaintiffs’ injuries were not caused by the
RICO predicate acts but by violations of state reporting
requirements.192 Moreover, “[t]he racketeering activities [were] not a
substantial factor . . . . [n]or were [the plaintiffs’] losses a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of that conduct.”193 Therefore, the plaintiffs
lacked standing.
In October, the Second Circuit clarified its approach in Baisch v.
Gallina,194 which involved a financier who was allegedly defrauded
by a father-and-son construction business in league with an insurance

185. Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1300.1(c) (2003) (“[A]
dishonored check report by a banking institution shall be required whenever a properly payable
instrument is presented against an attorney special, trust or escrow account which contains
sufficient available funds, and the banking institution dishonors the instrument for that
reason.”).
186. Lerner, 318 F.3d. at 117–18.
187. Id. at 118.
188. Id. at 118–19.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 119.
192. Id. at 123.
193. Id.
194. 346 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2003).
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company.195 Nassau County contracted Raycon, the father-and-son
company, to perform various construction projects.196 Nassau
County, under its agreement, required Raycon to hire only
employees, excluding independent contractors, for example, and
additionally mandated that the employees be covered by workers’
compensation, disability, and general liability insurance.197 Moreover,
Nassau County required that Raycon obtain performance bonds.198
According to Baisch, the plaintiff in this case, Frank Gallina, a
shareholder and vice president of McKinnon-Doxsee Insurance
Agency, helped Raycon obtain insurance policies and performance
bonds knowing that Raycon submitted inflated estimates and
falsified claim vouchers.199
Furthermore, Baisch’s suit against Gallina rested on the claim
that Raycon and Gallina defrauded him of nearly a half a million
dollars. Based on Gallina’s representations, Baisch agreed to enter a
factoring agreement with Raycon, whereby he would advance money
to Raycon based on claim vouchers submitted to him for work done
for Nassau.200 When Nassau County paid Raycon, Baisch was
supposed to receive payment for money lent.201 Baisch alleged that
Raycon submitted forty-four vouchers, which were fraudulent, and
some of which were never submitted to Nassau County and could,
therefore, never be repaid.202 Baisch was left, therefore, with having
lent the money but without the possibility of repayment. The court
held that Gallina’s “racketeering pattern of mail fraud proximately
caused [Baisch’s] injury.”203 Furthermore, Baisch’s injury was
reasonably foreseeable because “Baisch was a ‘target[]’ and ‘intended
victim[]’ of the racketeering enterprise.”204

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id.
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III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S NEW STANDARD FOR PROXIMATE
CAUSE: A DIRECT AND MECHANICAL REMOVAL OF THE PROPER
TRIPARTITE APPROACH
An analysis of the background to standing, and civil RICO
standing specifically, provides two general conclusions. First, the
general history of civil RICO standing illustrates the broad and
expansive nature of RICO and specifically the broad standing
requirements of civil RICO. Second, the standards employed by
courts have increasingly led to a variety of tests and analyses for
RICO standing, specifically for proximate cause. A proper
understanding of both the Court’s doctrine of standing and the
Court’s decision in Holmes shows that Holmes provides the proper
approach to proximate cause and standing under civil RICO.
Contrary to the proper Holmes analysis, however, the Second Circuit
created a mechanical and narrowly focused test for directness in
determining proximate cause, which tacitly disregards not only the
Holmes approach but also the policies and tensions underlying
standing generally and standing under civil RICO specifically.
Part III.A discusses two primary principles for understanding
standing, specifically as standing relates to statutory causes of action.
These two principles are, first, the need for taking special notice of
the tension between courts and Congress resulting from statues and,
second, the need for careful case-by-case determinations of standing.
Part III.B posits that the Court in Holmes appropriately accounted
for the tensions between standing and the policies of civil RICO by
providing for a fluid three-factor approach for determining
proximate cause. Part III.C argues that the Second Circuit ignored
the Court’s analysis in favor of a categorical and stringent directness
approach to proximate cause, which ultimately disrupts the policies
balanced by the Court and Congress in determining civil RICO
standing.
A. Two Principles of Standing Properly Understood
Although the Court’s standing doctrine has been criticized for its
vagueness and inconsistency,205 a proper understanding of the
concerns and policies underlying standing suggests two fundamental
considerations in understanding and analyzing standing, especially in
205. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
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a statutory context: (1) courts must take special notice of the tension
statutes create between courts and Congress, and (2) standing
generally rests on a careful case-by-case determination of the case at
hand rather than on any mechanical exercise.
First, standing in a statutory context requires courts to consider
the tension statutes create between the courts’ traditional prudential
limits and Congress’s directives. When courts judge aspects of law
removed from congressional enactment, such as common law or
constitutional issues, the policies of standing typically follow those
set down as constitutional or prudential limits on courts.206 Courts
are free to examine a variety of policies that counsel for or against
allowing a litigant into federal court.207 As discussed previously, the
traditional purpose of prudential standing is essentially to limit the
role of the federal judiciary.208 Without some form of limitation, the
federal “courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of
wide public significance even though other governmental institutions
may be more competent.”209 These concerns boil down to
considerations of “truly adverse” litigants,210 “judicial restraint,”211
ensuring that only the most directly affected parties litigate, ensuring
that there is a “concrete case,” and “preventing the anti-majoritarian
federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making functions of the
popularly elected branches”212 (i.e., “deference to the legislature”

206. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–502 (1975).
207. See supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (noting that standing is
grounded in the “idea of separation of powers” and reiterating the concern in Warth that
standing is based in the concern over the limited role of the judiciary); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498
(finding that standing “is founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of
the courts in a democratic society”); Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222 (noting that standing is
designed to “prevent[] the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making
functions of the popularly elected branches”); see also supra notes 60–70 and accompanying
text.
209. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
210. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1968);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 498–99).
211. Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue: A Brief Review of Current Standing Doctrine,
71 B.U. L. REV. 667, 678 (1991) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1974)).
212. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 222 (citing BICKEL, supra note 62); see Scalia, supra note
62, at 881.
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and “separation of powers”).213 However, when dealing with
statutes, courts are faced with the fact that the traditional prudential
limits courts place upon themselves are called into question.214
In terms of determining standing for violation of a statute, a
court’s concern typically centers on authorizing access to federal
courts only to those litigants that Congress intended.215 Essentially,
the court’s role, in a statutory context, is to enforce the legislature’s
choices and compromises without extending or restricting a statute’s
reach.216 Some courts and commentators have called this concern

213. Kusiak, supra note 211, at 678 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 760, and Schlesinger, 418
U.S. at 220–21, respectively). Although the Court’s standing jurisprudence has been criticized,
standing is not a trivial concept in federal jurisprudence:
Article III, which is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial
power of the United States as in its granting of that power, is not merely a
troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the “merits” of a
lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the basic charter
promulgated by the Framers of the Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter
which created a general government, provided for the interaction between that
government and the governments of the several States, and was later amended so as
to either enhance or limit its authority with respect to both States and individuals.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 476 (1982).
214. Although prudential limitations may be called into question, it is worth noting that
the constitutional standing limitations remain intact, as they are unalterable—they are an
“irreducible constitutional minimum.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992).
215. See generally William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 263 (2001) (noting that in Federal Election Commission v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Court approached its “[s]tanding analysis . . . in a manner that
explicitly wrapped this Article III constitutional question with judicial deference to the
statutory universe of interests and incentives created by the legislature”); id. at 274 (noting
also that within Justice Scalia’s discussions on standing there exists the proper view that a
“judiciary that seeks to enforce the substantive and procedural choices of the legislature, but
avoids expanding on particular preferred statutory purposes or changing the procedural devices
chosen, is showing fealty to the discernible legislative bargain manifest in a statute,” even
though Justice Scalia, according to Buzbee, is not necessarily consistent with this view); see also
Gottlieb, supra note 70, at 1077 (discussing the legal interests created by Congress and the
Court’s deferment to Congress because of those interests). What “Congress intended” could
fill volumes. The point, however, is that a court’s focus is taken away from issues purely dealing
with the proper role of the judiciary and centered on issues that Congress has decided the
courts should consider. See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163–66 (1997) (examining
the statutory language to determine congressional intent on standing).
216. Buzbee, supra note 215, at 248–49 (noting that “the ‘statutory universe’ of
legislatively created goals, procedures, and incentives remains central to standing analysis”; also
noting the “persistent . . . strain in standing jurisprudence that calls for a more limited and
deferential judicial standing role [for] [l]egislative judgments about statutory goals and means
[otherwise] refer[ed] to as ‘the statutory universe’”); see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163–66
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statutory standing.217 Regardless of the title, a court’s duty is to
determine whether a plaintiff has proper standing in court based on
the congressional compromises inherent within a statute and not
purely on traditional court-centered issues. A court’s duty in this
respect arises from Congress’s power to alter or eliminate the
traditional prudential grounds for limiting access to federal court.218
Congress may decide to extend standing to any party that meets the
core constitutional requirements or to otherwise place the
appropriate constraint on litigants anywhere else along the spectrum
of possible limits.219
For example, in interpreting the language of statutes, the Court
has acknowledged the judiciary’s submission to legislative will
concerning standing. The Court has determined that, based on the
language of the statute authorizing citizens to sue, courts should
look to the legislation to determine how Congress has struck the
balance in providing for entry into court.220 In Bennett v. Spear, the
Court compared the statute at hand with other previously
interpreted statutes to determine how broadly or narrowly Congress

(discussing the same principle in terms of zone-of-interest, or giving deference to the choices
of Congress). This deference in following Congress’s admonitions specifically in standing
comports with Justice Scalia’s views on following congressional directives generally. Justice
Scalia has noted that
[e]ven where a particular area is quite susceptible of clear and definite rules, we
judges cannot create them out of whole cloth, but must find some basis for them in
the text that Congress or the Constitution has provided. . . . The trick is to carry a
general principle as far as it can go in substantial furtherance of the precise statutory
or constitutional prescription.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989).
217. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1282 (1989) (discussing the rise of statutory standing
and the zone-of-interest test in administrative law). Although the concept has been employed
outside the administrative law framework, it has not been done with much success or
consistency. Therefore, for purposes of this Comment, I have chosen to discuss the impact of
statutes on traditional notions of constitutional and prudential standing. How statutory
standing has subsumed or duplicated anything discussed in this Comment must remain for
another day. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998).
Statutory standing is a difficult concept because of the almost complete lack of consistency or
treatment. Statutory standing initially arose in the context of administrative law as courts began
to consider whether a statute creating and authorizing an administrative agency also gave
private citizens, arguably harmed by an agency, standing to sue under that statute.
218. See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
219. See id. discussing Congress’s ability to modify or abrogate prudential standing.
220. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165.
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had formulated standing in that case.221 The Court examined
language such as “any person may commence a civil suit,” which had
“remarkable breadth,”222 in comparison with “[any person] having a
valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected,”223 or “any
person injured in his business or property.”224 Although each one of
these statutes allowed standing to a broad class of litigants, the
language of each determined, to some extent, the reach of the
standing analysis along a spectrum of breadth or restriction.225 In
other words, Congress’s specific authorization in these statutes
altered the Court’s typical prudential analysis, as the Court was
required to pay heed to the delicate balance struck by Congress
rather than focus only on the concerns of the judiciary.
The requirement that courts focus on congressional
compromises and balances embodied in a statute creates a tension
between this concern and the courts’ own prudential limits. Courts
must evaluate the ways in which a litigant’s standing is not only
altered by notions of judicial restraint but, more importantly, how it
is either restricted or broadened by the statute giving rise to the
cause of action.226 When confronted with a statute that sweeps
broadly or may raise “abstract questions” that are best left to “other
governmental institutions . . . more competent to address [these
types of] questions,”227 courts face the dilemma of how best to
utilize the prudential limits traditionally employed. The result is that
in interpreting broadly sweeping legislation, courts may feel
empowered with tools that restrict, albeit contrary to the legislative
will, the intended reach of the statute.

221. Id. at 164–65 (“The first question . . . is whether the [statute’s] citizen-suit
provision . . . negates the [standing] test (or, perhaps more accurately, expands the [test]).”).
The court then considered the language of the statute to determine how broad or restricted
standing was along a spectrum of possible standing requirements.
222. Id. at 164 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000)).
223. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g)) (alterations in original).
224. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c)).
225. Id. at 164–65 (discussing the breadth of each statutory formulation of standing in
comparison to others and which of these formulations completely eliminated prudential
standing so that only constitutional limits remained).
226. This may be one reason for Fletcher’s argument that standing be determined on the
merits alone, without regard for traditional ideas of standing. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at
222–24.
227. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–502 (1975).
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Such use of judicial standing tools to craft barriers to legislative
action intended to remedy broad concerns is inappropriate, as courts,
in limiting standing, alter or eliminate the purpose and delicate
balance created by Congress.228 Because standing rests, traditionally,
on concerns of separation of powers and antimajoritarian
difficulties,229 courts have typically employed standing as a limit on
access to court.230 But in circumstances in which Congress has
specifically created standing through a statutory cause of action, the
typical standing concerns run in the opposite direction. By
disregarding the thrust of a statute and limiting access to the litigants
to whom Congress intended to grant right of entry into the courts,
courts violate the same principles of separation of powers and
antimajoritarian difficulty as if they had allowed virtually every
litigant imaginable into federal court. Rather than leave the decision
with Congress, the courts answer those congressional questions and
address those legislative concerns by effectively ignoring Congress’s
choice. The effect of disregarding Congress is the same as if the
court had taken license with certain powers of the legislature.
Second, standing is intended to deny any attempt at formulating
a “mechanical exercise”231 but rather engenders careful judicial
examination on a case-by-case basis.232 The Court has avoided any
blackletter rules in its standing analysis.233 The result of not laying
down any rigid approach requires courts to consider cases one by
one and determine, based on standing policies and in light of other
cases, whether a litigant has standing in federal court.234 Rather than
employing categorical limits, the Court advocates a standing doctrine
designed to consider standing on a case-by-case basis, especially in
228. See Buzbee, supra note 215, at 274 (discussing Court precedent that does not
adequately account for Congress or its enactments and therefore destroys the statutes and their
purpose); cf. Gottlieb, supra note 70, at 1134–38 (discussing the use of unalterable
constitutional standing limits in place of prudential limits and the harm arising from not
respecting “Congress’s discretion to weigh countervailing considerations in its decision-making
process”).
229. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text.
231. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Kusiak, supra note 211, at 683–
84.
232. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (noting that the doctrine of standing is intended to avoid
making standing a “mechanical exercise”); see also Kusiak, supra note 211, at 683–84.
233. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475–76 (1982).
234. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
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situations wherein judicial limits stand in contrast to broadly
sweeping legislation.235 The Court’s standing doctrine is somewhat
vague, amorphous, and without exact definition precisely because
the Court wishes to avoid creating a mechanical exercise that would
detract from the careful deliberation necessary.236 This approach
ensures that courts contemplate the important compromises between
limiting access to federal court and congressional will, as well as the
specific policies and concerns underlying standing. Naturally,
Congress has the upper hand in any standing match because it may
modify any prudential limits. Thus, a flexible approach, as advocated
by the Court, strives for constant realignment with the congressional
will in light of judicial limits. Both concern for the policies of RICO
and the case-by-case check on the judiciary are present in and
characterize the Court’s proper tripartite approach to RICO
proximate cause standing.
B. Holmes and the Proper Proximate Cause Standard
for Civil RICO Standing
Although a variety of standards for proximate cause have arisen
in the wake of Holmes,237 a proper understanding of the Holmes
decision reveals that the correct basis for private RICO standing
based on proximate cause is the three-factor approach employed by
the Court. The tripartite analysis of Holmes provides for a proximate
cause analysis that accounts for the policies underlying civil RICO as
well as the concern for a case-by-case determination necessary for
standing. Even though the Supreme Court mentioned the common
law’s influence on the Sherman Act’s, and later the Clayton Act’s,
inclusion of proximate cause principles, the Court focused on
something related to, but apart from, traditional common law or
specific antitrust notions of proximate cause when espousing the
standard necessary to assert standing under civil RICO.238

235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See supra Part II.E.
238. Holmes v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1992); Goldsmith &
Tilton, supra note 4, at 101, 115–18. Although Goldsmith and Tilton argue that the three
factors of Holmes roughly equate to common-law principles of proximate cause, they still
conclude that the three factors are a distinct approach to balance the various concerns arising
from civil RICO claims. Id. But see Madonia, supra note 2, at 960–61; Shapiro, supra note 2,
at 1928 (finding that the Holmes decision endorsed common-law proximate cause generally).
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True, the Court emphasized directness in its formulation of
proximate cause,239 but it adopted a distinct form of directness that
focuses on three specific, flexible policies as opposed to general or
strict common-law notions of direct proximate cause.240 The Court
determined that the “use of the term ‘direct’ should merely be
understood as a reference to the proximate-cause enquiry that is
informed by the concerns set out in the text. [The Court] do[es] not
necessarily use it in the same sense as courts before [it] have . . . .”241
The “concerns set out in the text” consist of three policy
considerations. First, a court must consider what difficulties arise in
“ascertaining the amount of a plaintiff.’s damages attributable to the
violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors.”242 Second,
courts must consider how they may be required to “adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at
different levels of injury from the violative acts.”243 Third, courts
must deal with balancing how “the general interest in deterring
injurious conduct” is met, paying special attention to the fact that
“directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the
law . . . without . . . the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs
injured more remotely.”244
Although some courts have not specifically followed these three
factors in analyzing whether a plaintiff satisfies proximate cause, and
therefore standing,245 the Court makes clear that its “directness”
admonition consists of analyzing proximate cause standing based on
the three policy factors outlined. The Court explicitly states that
The difference between Goldsmith and Tilton and other authors is in how other authors
conceive of the common law relating to the Holmes approach. Goldsmith and Tilton “roughly
equate” the Holmes analysis to common law proximate cause but still consider the proper
approach to be the tripartite factors in Holmes and not notions of proximate cause generally.
Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 115–18. Other authors, however, see Holmes as licensing
the use of traditional proximate cause tests generally, rather than requiring adherence to a
balanced Holmes factor approach. Madonia, supra note 2, at 960; Shapiro, supra note 2, at
1928.
239. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (asserting that proximate cause carries “a demand for some
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”).
240. Id. at 269; see supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
241. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983)).
242. Id. at 269.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 269–70.
245. See supra Part II.E.
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“direct,” as it uses the word, means specifically those factors laid out
in the majority opinion and not general notions of directness.246
Thus, the proximate cause approach in Holmes does not arise from
any prior notion of causation’s scope or reach; rather, it comes from
the Court’s discussion of these factors.247 Essentially, the Court gives
the old name of proximate cause to its new policy approach in civil
RICO cases. This fact is evidenced by the Court’s own analysis,
which walks step by step through the three-part examination to
determine whether SIPC satisfied the proximate cause element
necessary to have standing under civil RICO.248 The Supreme Court
ultimately found that it did not.249 The Court determined that if
SIPC were allowed to sue, the courts would first need to investigate
“the extent to which their inability to collect from the broker-dealers
was the result of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate” and not some
other unrelated occurrence, such as the broker-dealers’ own “poor
business practices.”250 Second, the courts would then be required to
“find some way to apportion the possible respective recoveries” by
both the dealers and customers, each of whom may be entitled to
the threefold recovery of civil RICO.251 Third, “the law would be
shouldering these difficulties despite the fact that those directly
injured, the broker-dealers, could be counted on to bring suit for the
law’s vindication.”252 Thus, even though the Court speaks of
proximate directness in standing causality, it has its own formulation
consisting of a three-factor policy consideration.
In light of the Court’s attempt to formulate a standing doctrine
that adequately balances the concerns of restricting access to the
judiciary and allowing for the full impact of a broad statute,253 the
Court’s formulation of the tripartite test adequately accounts for the
strain between the courts and Congress. This approach does not
force a blackletter rule on courts or overly restrict plaintiffs. Rather,
this policy approach allows courts to balance various factors when
deciding standing. Although the Court announced general concerns
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
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Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20.
Id.
Id. at 272–74.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. The broker-dealers from Holmes did in fact bring suit. Id.
See supra notes 215–16, 226–36 and accompanying text.
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over directness, such as “a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing
merely from the misfortunes [of] a third person . . . was generally
said to stand at too remote a distance,”254 these pronouncements
remain mere concerns and not hard and fast rules. One factor alone
does not require the court to exclude a plaintiff, but mandates that a
court consider the case in accordance with RICO and its precedent.
Of course, each of the components looks to the limits inherent in the
judiciary, for example, whether it is equipped to make “complicated
rules.”255 But the analysis accounts for both limitations of courts and
Congress.
This approach also allows for RICO’s broad purposes. The broad
provisions of RICO256 and the Court’s precedent,257 which
interpreted civil RICO broadly, suggest that courts should consider
the expansive remedial nature of RICO in determining standing.258
Although the Court emphasizes directness,259 there is no rigid or
inflexible rule to eliminate suits.260 Rather, judges are to consider
these elements in light of civil RICO and its purposes, including
novel forms of fraud that may require looking past the harm done to
immediate plaintiffs.261 This test also rests on standing’s same
concern for case-by-case determinations, considering the policies and
tensions underlying the law.262 Ultimately, civil RICO standing
cannot derive from a mechanical formulation of directness but must
rest on considerations of the Court’s three-factor approach, which
represents an understanding of a court’s role in light of congressional
will.

254. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–69 (emphasis added) (citing 1 J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF
DAMAGES 55–56 (1882)). The court does not suggest that this is a per se rule. Rather the
court uses the term “generally” instead of “always.”
255. Id. at 269.
256. See supra Part II.B.
257. See supra Part II.C.
258. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1040–43.
259. See id.
260. See supra notes 239–52 and accompanying text.
261. Cf. Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 110–12.
262. See Allen v. Wright, 469 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see supra notes 226–36 and
accompanying text.
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C. The Second Circuit’s Direct and Mechanical Disruption of the
Proper Standing Analysis
Contrary to general principles of standing and the flexible
approach of Holmes,263 the Second Circuit created a direct and
mechanical test for proximate cause in civil RICO standing. This test
not only creates an almost categorical approach to proximate cause in
civil RICO standing, but also narrowly focuses its attention on the
predicate acts, making causation extremely restrictive. Although the
Second Circuit reached different results in each case,264 the court
declared its new direct and mechanical proximate cause analysis for
civil RICO standing in both Lerner v. Fleet Bank.265 and Baisch v.
Gallina.266 Following its decision in Commercial Cleaning Services v.
Colin Service Systems, Inc.267 and the language of § 1964,268 the
Second Circuit properly stated that a “plaintiff must plead . . . (1)
the defendant’s violation of [§] 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff’s
business or property, and (3) causation of the injury by the
defendant’s violation.”269 The first two prongs of this standing
analysis seem to conform to the broad standing requirements under
civil RICO.270 In discussing the third requirement, however, the
court departed from its precedent and the proper analysis under civil
RICO.
1. The Second Circuit’s standard for proximate cause
The Second Circuit’s new proximate cause analysis for standing
takes the form of a two-part test. Both components of the test focus
on mechanistic application of directness. “First, the plaintiff’s injury

263. See supra Part III.A–B.
264. Baish v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff did
have standing to sue); Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 532 (2003) (finding that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue).
265. 318 F.3d 113 (2d. Cir. 2003).
266. 346 F.3d 366 (2d. Cir. 2003).
267. 271 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating the standing requirements as “(1) the
defendant’s violation of § 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff’s business or property, and (3)
causation of the injury by the defendant’s violation”).
268. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970).
269. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 372 (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 120).
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue . . . .”). For a discussion of the generally
expansive standing requirements of civil RICO, see supra Parts II.B–C, III.B.
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must have been ‘proximately caused by a pattern of racketeering
activity violating [18 U.S.C. §] 1962 or by individual RICO
predicate acts.’”271 The court flatly concludes that if a plaintiff suffers
“an injury that was indirectly . . . caused by the racketeering activity
or RICO predicate acts,” he or she does not have standing.272 A
litigant, therefore, who may have been injured, but not primarily, by
a pattern or individual racketeering act has no standing to sue, even
if the injury is sizeable. The court’s analysis of this prong centers on
whether there was some larger intervening wrong other than a
predicate act under RICO allegedly committed by the defendant.
The court in Lerner determined that the primary injury arose not
from the predicate acts, but from “violations of state reporting
requirements.”273 Although the defendant had allegedly used the
mails to carry out the supposed violation and it was the corruption of
the Lawyer’s Fund enterprise that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s
injury,274 the court focused on the reporting requirements.275 The
court did not suggest that the plaintiffs were not injured by the
predicate acts or that the racketeering injuries were not substantial,
just that such injuries were not the primary injury.
Second, even if a litigant meets the first element, he must then
show that the injury was not too attenuated—that is, that it was a
“direct injury that was foreseeable.”276 This component, in turn, has
two elements: (1) the defendant’s acts must be a “substantial factor
in the sequence of . . . causation,” and (2) the injury must be
“reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.”277
Additionally, the court found fit to define the exact parameters of
foreseeability. The enumerated, satisfying elements of foreseeability
are “the targets, competitors and intended victims.”278 Although the
court determined that there can be more than one directly injured
plaintiff,279 and that, generally, directness itself is a necessary element
271. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373 (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122–23).
272. Id.
273. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123.
274. Id. at 119.
275. Id. at 123.
276. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373.
277. Id. at 374 (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123).
278. Id. (citing Lerner, 318 F.3d at 124).
279. Id. (“RICO standing extends to all directly injured parties, not just the most directly
injured among them.”). Although the court seems to broaden its approach by allowing more
than the most directly injured, it is important to note that the court’s standard is only slightly
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of causation, traditional or otherwise, the Second Circuit modified
the test into an “extraordinarily demanding test of causality.”280 The
court employed terms and phrases typically associated with flexibility,
or even expansiveness, such as “reasonably foreseeable,” when, in
fact, its test is restrictive. True, foreseeability is a test designed to cut
off liability, but it is a malleable test, generally not stringent or
mechanical.281 Rather than employ a flexible standard, the court
defines proximate cause, and therefore standing, outright and limits
standing to a rather select group of potential plaintiffs.
2. The elimination of Holmes’ flexibility in favor of categorical and
mechanical “directness”
The Second Circuit ultimately sets forth a fairly mechanical
approach to proximate cause and civil RICO standing, which is
squarely focused on directness and which flies in the face of the
flexible Holmes approach. The first part of the “Lerner-Baisch ”282 test
asks whether there is a larger intervening cause of the injury
alleged.283 If there is such a cause, the court excludes the plaintiff
from recovery. The essential problem with this component of the
.

more lenient. What is even more problematic is the implication that arises from this maneuver,
which seems almost to suggest that the court is operating on a result-oriented basis, proximate
cause being a tool to exclude unless the judges think it should not.
280. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1191 (1993).
281. See, e.g., Michael A. Hanzman, Establishing Injury “By Reason of.” Racketeering
Activity: A Critical Analysis of the 11th Circuit’s Per Se Detrimental Reliance Requirement and
its Impact on RICO Class Actions, 77 FLA. B.J. 36, 41 (2003) (“Proximate cause is an elusive
concept, one ‘always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent.’” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 279 (5th ed. 1984))).
282. Admittedly, the origin of this “first prong” is questionable. The court in Lerner was
trying to wrestle with the fact that the plaintiffs lacked any real particularized showing of
predicate acts but instead focused on the violation of reporting requirements almost entirely.
See Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123. The court, in order to drive the point home, found that the
“plaintiffs principally contend that their injuries were caused by defendants’ violations of state
reporting requirements.” Id. The court noted that “[a]t worst” this violation merely rose to
the level of breach of contract between the banks and the “Lawyer’s Fund,” not the fulfillment
of a predicate act under RICO. Id. The difficulty arises from the Baisch decision which
transformed the court’s problem in Lerner into an actual prong of their proximate cause
analysis. Rather than identify the predicate act problem as such, the Baisch court determined
that finding another intervening cause actually fell within the proximate cause test. Baisch, 346
F.3d at 373–74. To its credit, the court was most likely correct in finding as it did based on
Lerner.
283. See supra notes 272–75 and accompanying text.
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“test” is that it acts as a mechanical tool to remove standing. A
defendant must simply isolate another cause of the injury in order to
bypass any civil RICO suit. The effect of this rule is to give
defendants engaged in complex schemes to defraud or otherwise
commit racketeering violations a “get-out-of-treble-damages-free
card.” The purpose of the RICO statute is, to some extent, to
infiltrate and weed out complex schemes and plans that were
otherwise untouchable under previously existing law enforcement
tools.284 The result of this first prong is to blunt a new tool provided
for the express purpose of carving out and punishing, civilly or
criminally, new and increasingly complex forms of racketeering.285
Instead, a defendant blessed by the winds of fate may find she is not
liable for treble damages because the “primary” cause of a plaintiff’s
alleged injuries was in fact a breach of contract, not the use of mails
to carryout the fraudulent scheme planned.
Another vexatious element of this first prong is its application. In
Lerner, the court found that the failure to report bounced checks
was the principal injury the plaintiffs alleged and that, therefore, the
plaintiffs could not establish proximate cause.286 In Baisch, the court
determined that Baisch’s suit against Gallina was valid even though
one could argue that the true, primary injury to Baisch was Rubino’s
breach of the factoring agreement.287 The court found that “Baisch’s
injury was directly caused by Rubino’s fraudulent factoring
agreement,” and that because Gallina had a hand in inducing Baisch
to enter into the agreement, there was a direct link between Gallina’s
fraudulent conduct (inducing Baisch to enter an agreement with
parties Gallina knew to be engaged in fraudulent activity) and the
harm resulting from the fraud.288
In both cases, the defendant allegedly committed some form of
fraud in the transaction between the parties.289 In Lerner, the banks
284. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1013; supra notes 95–102 and
accompanying text.
286. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123.
287. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 374. The district court in fact found precisely that the direct
injury was the factoring agreement, which cut off liability to Gallina. The plaintiffs, therefore,
had no standing against Gallina.
288. Id. at 374, 376–77.
289. Both cases involved mail or wire fraud as the predicate act. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 119
(“Plaintiffs . . . allege that defendants committed several predicate acts of mail and wire
fraud . . . by: stamping dishonored checks ‘refer to maker’ rather than ‘insufficient funds’ and
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allegedly committed mail fraud against the defendants directly, as
well as against the Lawyer’s Fund, by misrepresenting Schick’s illicit
activities.290 In Baisch, Gallina fraudulently induced Baisch to enter a
factoring agreement partially through the use of the mails.291
Admittedly, the connection is closer in Baisch, as Gallina allegedly
induced Baisch to enter an agreement that ultimately became the
source of his injury,292 whereas the banks in Lerner merely prolonged
Schick’s activities through their alleged fraud.293 The sticky point,
however, rests on the cause of the injury: an allegedly third, more
primary injury. The injury in both cases arose principally from a
third-party violation. In Lerner, the harm that allegedly befell the
plaintiffs derived from the banks’ failure to report fraudulent checks,
which prolonged the plaintiffs’ injury by Schick.294 In Baisch, the
injury came from Rubino’s ultimate breach of their factoring
agreement.295 The difference between these two cases is obvious in
that Baisch involved a plaintiff who was a party to the breached
agreement.296 The point remains, however, that each case involved a
suit not against the primary, violating party, but against the more
removed party. Although at varying degrees, each case involves
RICO claims that were only incidental to the real infringement. Part
of the reason for this difference is the court’s overly narrow focus on
the predicate acts, which is discussed in more detail below.297
Additionally, it may have been difficult to pass up a situation that
smacks of common-law fraud, that is, reliance on misrepresentations.
However, the court never discusses such implications, and reliance is
not an element of civil RICO proximate cause.298

returning bounced checks to the payees, including plaintiffs . . . mailing bank statements . . .
that neglected to mention the dishonored checks; and reassuring some of those notified of the
dishonored checks that the checks had been dishonored because of a computer glitch . . . .”);
Baisch, 346 F.3d at 369–70.
290. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 119.
291. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 370–71.
292. Id. at 374.
293. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 119.
294. Id.
295. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 374.
296. Id.
297. See infra notes 308–17 and accompanying text.
298. See Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 110–11; see also infra notes 318–23 and
accompanying text.
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The mechanistically direct nature of the Second Circuit’s
proximate cause test is even more evident in the second prong,
which states that the injury must be both a substantial factor and
reasonably foreseeable in order for the plaintiff to satisfy the
demands of proximate cause.299 On its face, this prong of the LernerBaisch test seems more like the policy considerations and flexibility
normally attributed to proximate cause.300 The idea that the cause of
the plaintiff’s alleged injuries must be a substantial factor comports
with traditional ideas of proximate cause.301 Additionally, in some
respects, it appears to be similar to the first prong of the Holmes
tripartite test, as its purpose is to focus the court’s attention on the
primary causes of the injury.302 Although the court does not
elaborate on the substantiality portion of this test, the test seems
more rigid than the policy concerns and spectrum approach of
Holmes. Holmes did not create a hard and fast rule303 but rather
isolated one factor for courts to consider in determining whether a
plaintiff should be given the opportunity to have her case heard. The
court here invoked this standard in such a way so as to suggest that
failure to meet it ends the inquiry.
The more problematic aspect of this prong of the test is the
court’s focus on “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural
consequence,”304 thereby eliminating a flexible standard in favor of a
categorical rule. Standing on its own, this aspect of the court’s
opinion appears as though it may be a mere reformulation of the
Court’s policy considerations in Holmes.305 However, the Second
Circuit goes far beyond reformulation and simply defines the

299. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123; Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373–74.
300. See Hanzman, supra note 281, at 41 (“Proximate cause is an elusive concept, one
‘always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, justice, policy and precedent.’” (citing KEETON, supra note 281, § 42, at
279)).
301. Goldsmith & Tilton, supra note 4, at 115–16 (connecting the first prong of the
Holmes factor approach with the common law requirement that “the defendant’s activities were
a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries”).
302. Id.
303. See supra notes 257–61 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373.
305. Because proximate cause has traditionally been viewed as a policy consideration, see
Hanzman, supra note 281, at 41, a flexible approach to proximate cause in the civil RICO
context may not do harm to Holmes ’ policy considerations, or at least not the type of harm
that the Second Circuit’s strict directness inflicts.
.
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necessary requisites for proximate cause under civil RICO.306
Moreover, the court sees fit to state outright those persons who may
bring a civil RICO suit—“reasonably foreseeable victims of a RICO
violation are the targets, competitors and intended victims of the
racketeering enterprise.”307 Thus, even if a plaintiff manages to satisfy
the first prong and the first half of the second prong, she may
nevertheless be denied standing to sue by reason of her failure to fall
within one of these categories. Viewed differently, the court’s test
ought to begin by determining whether the plaintiff is a “target[],
competitor[,] or intended victim[]” of the RICO violation. If so,
then the plaintiff must still show that not only was the defendant’s
violation a substantial factor in causing his harm, but also that there
was no other intervening cause that more appropriately characterizes
the harm suffered. Compare this formulation of the proximate cause
standard for standing under civil RICO with the broad language of
§ 1964: “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 . . . .”308 Apparently, the formulation is
actually any person injured in his business or property except anyone
not a target, competitor or victim, and then only if an injury is
sufficiently focused on that plaintiff.
In addition to being mechanically direct in theory, the Second
Circuit’s proximate cause test is even more mechanical and restrictive
in application by effectively limiting its proximate cause
determination to causes arising from the predicate acts and not a
violation of § 1962. The court’s test boils down to an overly narrow
focus on proximate cause from the predicate acts. Initially, the
Second Circuit uses broad language to describe its proximate cause
test: plaintiffs must show “that their injury was proximately caused
‘by a pattern of racketeering activity violating section 1962 or by
individual RICO predicate acts.’”309 The court in Lerner derives this
language from a prior case, Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House,
Inc.310 Hecht in turn relies on the broad analysis of Bankers Trust Co.

306. Baisch, 346 F.3d at 373–74 (“[T]he reasonably foreseeable victims of a RICO
violation are the targets, competitors, and intended victims of the racketeering enterprise.”
(quoting Lerner, 318 F.3d at 124)).
307. Id. at 374; see Lerner, 318 F.3d at 120.
308. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
309. Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122–23 (citing Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897
F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1990)).
310. 897 F.2d 21 (2d. Cir. 1990); see also Lerner, 318 F.3d at 122–23.
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v. Rhoades.311 in finding that “the injury must be caused by a
[violation of] section 1962 or by individual RICO predicate acts.”312
The court in Bankers Trust essentially followed the expansive lead of
the Court in Sedima—that is, that civil RICO be read broadly and
with “no special limitation on standing.”313 By including the
possibility of finding proximate cause based not only on a violation
of § 1962, but also on a violation of the individual predicate RICO
acts, the court was, in essence, attempting to retain the expansive
and far-sweeping impact of the civil RICO provision.314 The court
noted that a plaintiff’s “injury is not limited to damages suffered
from the RICO violation as a whole, but also includes injuries
suffered from each predicate act.”315
The Second Circuit in Lerner and Baisch, however, transforms
this broad finding into a narrow and restrictive limit on proximate
cause in RICO standing. Rather than determine whether the
defendant’s alleged activity, as a whole, violated a provision of
§ 1962 that in turn proximately caused an injury to the plaintiffs, the
court in each case chose to focus only on causation arising from the
predicate acts.316 Rather than determine whether the defendants in
Lerner had violated any predicate acts which in turn allowed them to
maintain, invest, or control an enterprise, the result of which
proximately injured the defendants, the court focused on whether
the specific predicate acts proximately caused the injury.317 While
explaining that the plaintiffs’ mere recitation of a chain of causation
cannot sustain RICO standing, the court stated that “[i]n order to
demonstrate some link between the RICO violations alleged and the
loss of their investments, plaintiffs must show that, if the defendant

311. 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).
312. Hecht, 897 F.2d at 23.
313. Bankers Trust Co., 859 F.2d at 1100.
314. See id.; see also supra Part II.B–C (discussing the broad sweep of the RICO statute
and the expansive standing requirements of Sedima).
315. Bankers Trust Co., 859 F.2d at 1100.
316. This has been labeled as “convergence” causation by some attorneys. See Green Leaf
Nursery, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003),
petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL 114472, *18–*22 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2004) (No. 03-1050);
Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL
22428715, at *11–*23 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2003) (No. 03-189). In essence, these petitioners argue
that the courts have needlessly restricted the proximate cause test to only those plaintiffs who
suffered the underlying predicate injury as well as the civil RICO injury.
317. See Lerner, 318 F.3d at 123–24.
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banks had not committed the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud,”
a variety of third party actions would then occur, which in turn
would alleviate the fraud perpetrated by Schick.318 The court’s focus
on the predicate acts as the starting point from which the “chain of
causation” begins is far too narrow.
The end result of this test, which focuses on the predicate acts
for determining whether the injury was proximately caused by the
defendant, is an overly restrictive standard. In essence, the court
requires that the plaintiff be the person, or among the select few
persons, duped by the fraudulent scheme in order to recover.319
Nothing in the language of the RICO statute, however, states that
proximate cause is determined from the predicate acts.320 In fact, one
wonders how, in many circumstances, this test requiring that the
predicate acts and the RICO violation be perpetrated on the same
plaintiff operates in the case of murder.321 The statute itself creates
no such limitation on proximate cause. Section 1964 simply states
that “[a]ny person injured in their business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 . . . may sue therefor.”322 And the emphasis
in § 1962 is on investing, maintaining, or conducting an enterprise
by virtue of the predicate acts.323 Thus, a person may be injured by
the investment of a racketeer, who in no way perpetrated fraud on
the plaintiff but merely used fraud or murder as a means to further or
complete the investment which itself gave rise to the injury. Under
the Second Circuit’s rule, however, that person may not recover.
The result of this focus on the predicate acts as the point by which to
judge proximate causation is that the test severely and mechanically
limits standing to the plaintiff who can demonstrate this
“convergence” of predicate injury and RICO injury.324

318. Id. at 124.
319. See, e.g., Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1994); Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Matikari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1993).
320. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) states, “by reason of a violation of section 1962,” not
necessarily the predicate acts.
321. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Section 1961(1)(A) lists “any act or threat involving murder”
as a predicate act.
322. Id. § 1964(c) (emphasis added).
323. Id. § 1962; see also supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., Green Leaf Nursery, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d
1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2004 WL 114472, *18–*22 (U.S. Jan.
20, 2004) (No. 03-1050); Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003), petition for cert.
filed, 2003 WL 22428715, *11–*23 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2003) (No. 03-189).
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3. Implications of the Second Circuit test
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s proximate cause analysis is a
needlessly limiting and mechanical test for causation and standing. A
defendant may first eliminate the plaintiff.’s standing by attributing
the injury to some other cause. If the other cause is significant
enough, then the defendant is relieved of the suit. This aspect of the
court’s test is further restricted by the court’s narrow focus on the
predicate acts—a focus that makes the first part of the court’s test
overly stringent, as it is extremely likely that a court may find that a
breach of contract actually caused the injury to the plaintiff over an
act of mail fraud, when in fact the overall harm may be attributable
to the maintenance of or investment in an enterprise by virtue of the
mail fraud. Even if the plaintiff passes this first barrier to standing,
she must still show that the predicate acts themselves proximately
caused the injury (of course, first taking into account the fact that
the plaintiff must ultimately be a target, competitor, or intended
victim to even entertain a suit).
In the end, the Second Circuit’s test for proximate cause, and
therefore standing, obliterates the Holmes standing approach which
accounts for the policies of standing and civil RICO.325 Rather than
follow an approach that allows for policy considerations on all sides
and on a case-by-case basis to see whether the policies of RICO are
upheld and the victim is made whole,326 the Second Circuit instead
creates a test that grants standing to only a select few plaintiffs. In
essence, the Second Circuit has created a blackletter rule for standing
where the Supreme Court has determined none exists.327
The Second Circuit has created a test that provides no deference
to Congress, but merely imposes the judiciary’s own policies. Rather
than considering the compromises and the tension between the
courts and Congress—which would account for RICO’s broad reach
and attempt at eliminating new and novel forms of racketeering—the
court simply creates standing requirements that allow for only a

325. See supra Part III.B.
326. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 82, at 1042 (“RICO . . . is more concerned with
compensating victims and making them whole than in maintaining a competitive economy
where the ‘competitive acts’ are racketeering in character.”).
327. See supra notes 152, 245–55 and accompanying text; see also Holmes v. Secs.
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272 n.20 (1992) (noting that it is “virtually impossible to
announce a blackletter rule”).
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limited number of potential plaintiffs—a class much narrower than
civil RICO was intended to redress. The ultimate result is that this
test destroys the balance struck by Congress, which the courts have
been asked to uphold.328
Moreover, because the result of the Second Circuit’s test is so
narrow, the court will continue to alter and modify its rule with the
ebb and flow of new RICO cases, especially as people become more
adept at racketeering. The problem is that the legitimacy of the court
might be called into question. For example, in Baisch, the lower
court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue based on
Lerner’s analysis because he did not satisfy the direct injury of both
the predicate act and the RICO violation.329 According to the court,
the party that was harmed most directly was Nassau County, and
Nassau County was therefore the only party that had standing.330 In
order to find that Baisch had standing, the court was required to ease
back on the rule in Lerner by allowing more than one “target[],
competitor[] and intended victim[].”331 Because RICO was initially
intended as a far-reaching and powerful tool against complex
schemes and plans of racketeering, the Second Circuit will likely find
that it must constantly revise and broaden its rule to find “justice.”
The ultimate dilemma is that with such a mechanical and categorical
rule, the perception might be that a court is making up the rules as it
goes along. A flexible, policy-based, case-by-case approach has the
advantage of allowing a court the leeway necessary to accommodate
new and novel forms of fraud or racketeering while still requiring the
court to explicate its thinking process. Any concerns that this flexible
standard also loses its legitimacy is countered by Justice O’Connor’s
observation that “standing concepts have gained considerable
definition from developing case law. . . . [T]he standing question can
be answered chiefly by comparing the allegations of the particular
complaint to those made in prior standing cases.”332 The precedential
quality of a case-by-case policy approach is sufficiently grounded for
legitimacy but flexible enough for new situations and cases.

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
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See supra notes 215–30, 253–62 and accompanying text.
Baisch v. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 371 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. (“Nassau County, not Baisch, was the target of the racketeering enterprise.”).
Id. at 374.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751–52 (1984).
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The Second Circuit’s standard, in the end, is one in which the
court focuses exclusively on the limits associated with standing in
federal court, rather than the balance between court and Congress.
The court seems to dwell on the concerns and problems surrounding
allowing access to federal court.333 But the court’s adherence to the
limits placed on standing flies in the face of the purpose of standing,
which attempts to balance the choices and compromises of the
legislature and their impact on the courts.334 The court would
seemingly rather mow through fields of litigants with a plow than
selectively pick the ripe and proper plaintiffs it was sent to find.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s standing doctrine, although at times inconsistent,
sets forth the various principles necessary to enter federal court. The
civil provisions of the RICO statute formulated a rather broad
standard for allowing plaintiffs to redress their potential racketeering
claims. The Court, in interpreting civil RICO, followed the
congressional mandate to allow for a wide class of litigants. This
concern for the policies and compromises embodied by RICO is
reflected in the Court’s tripartite policy approach to civil RICO
proximate cause. Contrary to the policies underlying standing and
specifically civil RICO standing, however, the Second Circuit
disregarded the Holmes approach and even its own precedent in
Commercial Cleaning Services v. Colin Service Systems, Inc. Instead,
the court moved toward a mechanical, direct test for proximate
cause—a test that pays no heed to the delicate balance necessary to
weigh the concerns between court and Congress—and pays no
homage to the proper standards announced before it. Although the
outcome may have been the same in either case, the Second Circuit
should still have applied the three-factor proximate cause test of
Holmes.
Ryan C. Morris.335

333. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 215–16, 226–36 and accompanying text.
335. The Author would like to thank all those who have assisted him in this endeavor,
especially his wife, Brooke, and son, William. He would also like to thank the BYU Law
Review for its efforts in his behalf.
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